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RETURNING TO THE ROOTS OF THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: THE "BUT FOR" TEST
REGAINS PRIMACY IN CAUSAL ANALYSIS IN
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
PROPOSED RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS
John D. Rue*
There was a man in our town,
And he was wondrous wise,
He jumped into a bramble bush,'
And scratched out both his eyes;
But when he saw his eyes were out,
With all his might and main,
He jumped into another bush,
And scratched 'em in again.
2
INTRODUCTION
Under the common law, courts used the word "cause"
interchangeably to characterize "what happened," or, alternatively,
"what law ought to do about it."3  An empirically ascertainable
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law; M.F.A., 1993, Sarah
Lawrence College; B.A., 1990, Nottingham Trent University. I gratefully
acknowledge the substantial and invaluable guidance of Associate Dean Benjamin
Zipursky; sine qua non. Thanks goes especially to Nina Rue for her ongoing
encouragement, and also to Professor George Conk, Dr. Richard Sahn, Dr. Thomas
i.E. Walker, Dr. Robert Smith, William Wilson, Esq., Danielle DePalma, Michele
Kogon, and Hanna Shay. Finally, I wish to express sincere gratitude to the Honorable
Judge Guido Calabresi for his generous assistance.
1. Cf Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1071 (2001)
[hereinafter Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush]; Richard W. Wright,
Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof Pruning the
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001 (1988) [hereinafter
Wright, Pruning the Bramble Bush]; Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930); The
Man in Our Town, "Mother Goose" (circa 1760), reprinted in Llewellyn, supra; see
infra text accompanying note 2.
2. "Mother Goose," supra note 1; see also infra text accompanying note 444.
3. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. 1995) (Cornyn, J.,
concurring); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 60
(1956) (internal quotations omitted); Interview with Hon. Guido Calabresi, Judge,
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in New Haven, Conn. (Feb. 12, 2003)
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connection between a defendant's tortious act and a plaintiff's injury
("factual cause") has long been considered a threshold question of
liability.4 Factual causation is an objective question of fact5 and can
stem either from an overt act or from a failure to act.' From the
perspective of negligence law, the failure to act-for instance the
failure to provide sufficient fire escape routes from a residential
apartment,7 to warn of inherent product dangers,' or to fence off a
[hereinafter Calabresi Interview]; see also Arno C. Becht & Frank W. Miller, The
Test of Factual Causation in Negligence and Strict Liability Cases 2-4 (1961); Morton
J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1870-1960: The Crisis Of Legal
Orthodoxy 52 (1992) [hereinafter Crisis Of Legal Orthodoxyl.
4. William L. Prosser, Torts § 41 (4th ed. 1971). Under traditional factual
causation analysis, courts would delineate "proximate" causes from "remote" ones.
See Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: A
Philosophical View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines, 35 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 875, 878 (2002) (asserting that "[tlhe emphasis on direct traceability, or cause
and effect, dominates the law of traditional torts"). "Proximate" is used here to mean
immediate, or the opposite of attenuated. This concept of "proximate" cause should
not be confused with the modern, policy-driven causal analysis usually referred to by
the same name. This older use of the term had its source in Lord Bacon's Maxims of
the Law, which articulated its first maxim thus: "In jure non remota causa, sed
proxima spectatur" ("In law, look to proximate, not remote, causes."). Horwitz, supra
note 3, at 52 (quoting F. Bacon, Maxims of the Law, in 7 Works 307, 327 (J. Spedding
et al. eds., 1879)).
5. Prosser, supra note 4, § 41; Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59
Yale L.J. 238, 252 (stating that "[alccording to the orthodox view, whether event A is
the cause of event B is a question of objective fact to which all value judgments are
irrelevant"). Factual cause is distinct from "proximate" or "legal cause," the
determination of which is primarily policy-driven. See Daniel B. Dobbs, The Law of
Torts 409 (2000) (noting that "moral and practical judgments" are important
questions in causation analysis, but that "the law has separate places for them," and
that they should not be "import[ed]" from proximate cause analysis. A detailed
examination of proximate cause is beyond the scope of this Note, and for its purposes
I assume the validity of this bifurcated view of causation into "proximate" cause and
"factual" cause (although this Note will necessarily discuss the historical evolution of
the dichotomy). For an overview of proximate cause, see generally Dobbs, supra at
443-92. For the classic jurisprudential articulation of the doctrine of proximate cause,
as differentiated from cause-in-fact, see Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162
N.E. 99, 101-05 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). See also Guido Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 69, 85-90 (1975) (arguing that "but for" causation has little if any relevance to
the policies pursued by tort law, and therefore advocating a greater reliance on a
"causal link" analysis in pursuit of those policies). But see Malone, supra note 3, at
66-67 (arguing that policy considerations inevitably affect any attempt at objective
causation analysis using the "but for" test, and that "[t]he essential weakness of the
but for test is the fact that it ignores the irresistible urge of the trier to pass judgment
at the same time that he observes").
6. Prosser, supra note 4, § 41. But see Mario J. Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of
Causation, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 397, 398 (1987) (arguing that "omissions are not
causal processes. An omission simply permits a system to go on its way"); see infra
notes 243-49.
7. Higgins Inv., Inc. v. Sturgill, 509 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1974) (holding defendant
landlord liable for negligence in decedent's death by fire, for failing to provide two
means of escape from decedent's apartment).
8. See, e.g., East Penn Mfg. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 1990).
THE "BUT FOR" TEST
railroad track'-can be just as much the cause of an injury as the
proactive initiation of a sequence of events that brings about harm to
another."' If such omissions are found to be the source of an injury,
liability will generally result.
Nonetheless, in order to prove factual causation, the plaintiff must
show that the act or omission in question resulted in the harm to the
plaintiff.1 2  Classically, cause-in-fact was determined using the "but
for" test. 3 Simply stated, "but for" analysis requires the finder of fact
to determine that the asserted harm would not have come to pass "but
for" the defendant's tortious act. 4 An action is not a "but for" cause
of an injury if the injury would have come about regardless of the
action.
Since the 1920s, however, courts have also used what is now known
as the "substantial factor" test to determine whether or not a tortious
act caused the plaintiff's harm. 6 This doctrine was given a gigantic
boost by its adoption in the original Restatement of Torts ("First
Restatement") by the American Law Institute ("ALI" or
"Institute").Y '7 The First Restatement's treatment of factual causation
codified the "substantial factor" test as the primary element of the
causal inquiry." Since that time, the use of the "substantial factor"
test has mushroomed, and functions as a part of the causation analysis
conducted by courts in "virtually every jurisdiction."' 9
I In May 2003, the ALI proposes to revise its articulation of the test
for factual causation.21' The ALI's most recent statement of this test
was adopted in 1979, and is contained in sections 430 through 433 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)"). 2'
9. Hayes v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., Il1 U.S. 228, 241 (1884) (asserting that the
plaintiff need only show "that there is reasonable probability that the accident
resulted from the want of some precaution which the defendants might and ought to
have resorted to" [sic]).
10. Prosser, supra note 4, § 41.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Calabresi Interview, supra note 3, at 85.
14. Prosser, supra note 4, § 41.
15. Id.
16. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 179 N.W. 45, 46-47
(Minn. 1920) (holding sufficient for a finding of liability a jury determination that the
defendant's conduct had been a "substantial factor" in bringing about the injury to
the plaintiff); Dobbs, supra note 5, at 415.
17. Restatement of Torts, § 432 (1934) [hereinafter First Restatement].
18. Id.
19. Ralph Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims' Rights, 22 Gonz.
L. Rev. 15, 16 n.8 (1986) (stating that in "virtually every jurisdiction, a defendant may
be held liable in the first place only if the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm").
20. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm: Basic Principles
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002), §§ 26-28 [hereinafter Draft Revisions].
21. Section 431 defines legal cause as one which is a "substantial factor" in
bringing about the harm, barring a legal excuse. Section 432 then defines "substantial
2003] 2681
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Under the new standard, articulated in proposed sections 26 to 28
("Draft Revisions" or "Draft"') of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
Basic Principles of Liability ("Restatement (Third)"), the ALI would
declare the classic "but for" test to be the majority rule.22 The
"substantial factor" doctrine, first articulated in Anderson v.
Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway,23 incorporated into
the First Restatement, 4 and retained largely unaltered in the
Restatement (Second),25 would be repudiated.26  If the ALI's
membership 27 adopts the proposed revisions, both the "substantial
factor" doctrine and the language associated with it would be entirely
excised from the Restatement (Third).28
The ALI asserts that this change is necessary because courts have
employed the substantial factor test in ways, and in the pursuit of
ends, utterly foreign to the original purpose of the rule.29 In
evaluating the ALI's claim, this Note reviews the historical context in
which the substantial factor doctrine arose, and conducts an analysis
of the functional purposes the doctrine has served over time. This
Note argues that the ALI's proposed changes are warranted, although
the basis for making those changes may be insufficiently documented
in case law by the Reporters' Notes.
Adopting these revisions would elucidate an area of the law that has
grown exponentially more opaque since the publication of the
Restatement (Second). The resulting clarity would bolster legal
certainty at a time when tort law itself is under fire in public
discourse.3" This opacity and public criticism combine to create ample
justification for the ALI's new position.
factor" as a "but for" cause, with a caveat. Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979)
[hereinafter Restatement (Second)]: see infra Parts 1.B, lI.B.
22. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26, at 29.
23. 179 N.W. 45, 46-47 (Minn. 1920). The court was likely influenced by a
suggestion of the test in a three-part article published in the Harvard Law Review.
Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 223, 303 (1912).
24. First Restatement, supra note 17, §§ 430-33.
25. Restatement (Second), supra note 21, §§ 430-33.
26. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26, at 39-40, 56-64.
27. The membership of the ALI is made up of "judges, practicing lawyers, and
legal scholars from all areas of the United States as well as some foreign countries,
selected on the basis of professional achievement and demonstrated interest in the
improvement of the law." Press Release, Am. Law. Inst., Kathryn Oberly Elected to
American Law Institute Council (Feb. 4, 2003), at http://www.ali.org (last visited on
Apr. 6, 2003).
28. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26, at 39-40, 56-64.
29. Id., § 26 cmt. j, at 39 (asserting that the "substantial factor" test has "prove[n]
confusing and [is] being misused").
30. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social
Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and
Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 88 (1993) (arguing that "tort law is not a very sensible
system" for meeting the policy goal of compensating victims); see also Paul A. Crotty,
Tort Reform: Shutting Off the Money Faucet, 2 City L. 125 (1996) (advocating special
protection from tort litigation for the city of New York).
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The Reporters' Notes3 accompanying the proposed revisions,
however, are incomplete: they do not acknowledge the deep divisions
between jurisdictions in this area of the law. If the Draft is to avoid
the same sort of controversy that surrounded the adoption of the
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability32 and offer persuasive
support for the jurisprudential shift to the "but for" test that it
advocates, the ALI must be more forthcoming about the extent to
which its proposals go beyond merely restating the law. The drafters
should frankly admit that they are offering a prescriptive vision for the
direction in which the law ought to evolve, if this in fact is their aim.
Part I of this Note discusses the origin, implementation, and
limitations of the most commonly used tests of cause-in-fact, the "but
for" and "substantial factor" tests. This part then examines the
manifestations of these tests in the first two Restatements, discusses
the subsequent caselaw relying on those formulations, examining the
following categories of cases: (a) "two fires" cases similar to
Anderson,33  (b) toxic torts (including asbestos) cases, (c)
environmental torts cases, (d) those cases decided under a "loss of
chance" theory in medical malpractice, and (e) "butterfly effect"
cases, which use the "substantial factor" doctrine to prevent the
imposition of limitless liability on an admitted tortfeasor for the
damages factually caused by the wrongdoing. Finally, Part I
summarizes the pending revisions to the Restatement (Third). Part II
31. The Restatements, according to the ALL:
[C]onsist[] of Introductory Notes, rules of law presented in blackletter type
and numbered sections, and accompanying Comments and Reporters'
Notes. The Introductory Notes, the rules of law in blackletter type, and the
Comments express the views of the Institute.... The Reporters' Notes, on
the other hand, reflect the views of the Reporters and describe the legal
sources that they have considered relevant.
I Restatement of Foreign Relations XI.
32. See e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALl
Members in Drafting the Restatements, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 641, 660 (1998) (arguing
that "[c]onflicts of interest on the part of members of the ALI have called into
question the integrity of ALl Restatements of the Law"); Frank J. Vandall, A
Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment as it Affects Joint and Several
Liability, 49 Emory L.J. 565, 621 (2000) (accusing the Institute of "masking" its true
intentions, and asserting that "[a] true Restatement would adopt the dominant
position"); Frank J. Vandall, The American Law Institute Is Dead in the Water, 26
Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 802 (1998) (arguing that the rejection of the consumer
expectations rule in the Restatement (Third) of Product Liability is not a fair
reflection of the state of the law); Calabresi Interview, supra note 3 (asserting that the
ALl "gets it wrong" when it declares the risk/utility rule to have supplanted the
consumer expectations rule, and further arguing that New York, California, and other
significant jurisdictions have rejected this analysis and remain committed to a two
factor approach, allowing the plaintiff to prove defendant liability in either way).
33. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn.
1920). This case, involving the assignment of liability to a defendant who at most
shared responsibility for the plaintiff's injury with a fire of unknown origin, was the
first of a type which are now referred to by the Draft Revisions as "multiple sufficient
causation" cases. See infra Part I.B. I.
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surveys the scholarly criticism of both standards, presents an analysis
of cases that have relied heavily on the "substantial factor" doctrine
since its inception, with an emphasis on those decided since the
publication of the Restatement (Second), and then examines of the
likely outcome in cases of each of these categories under the new
proposed standard.34
Part III argues that the changes proposed are well advised, if not
long overdue, despite the fact that the ALI would be well served by an
effort to flesh out the Reporters' Notes and to provide a more
instructive delineation between its attempts to restate the law and its
desire to reshape it. The proposed revisions indicate that the ALI is
on its way to bolstering certainty in American tort law, which is good
for both plaintiffs and defendants. 5  Therefore, whether the
Reporters' Notes are revised or not, courts currently committed to the
substantial factor test should carefully consider the approach
advocated by the Institute.
I. "BUT FOR" AND THE RISE OF "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR"
The "but for" test emerged unchallenged from the mists of time,
entering the twentieth century as the only widely accepted judicial test
of factual cause.36 But like Athena, who sprang forth fully-grown and
armored from Zeus' head,37 the "substantial factor" test burst
explosively on to the jurisprudential landscape at the beginning of the
twentieth century.3" At first, the "substantial factor" test functioned
merely as a stopgap measure to shore up the distinguished and time-
proven "but for" test.3 But as the century wore on, "substantial
factor" jurisprudence increased in both complexity and prevalence.4
Today, the "substantial factor" test stands side-by-side with "but for"
in most jurisdictions.4" At times, these two standards function
34. In fact, the last on this list, the "butterfly effect" cases, seemed to be the
primary motivation for the inclusion of "substantial factor" language in the
Restatement. Foreword to Restatement of Torts (Preliminary Draft No. 41A, 1931.)
(asserting that legal cause "deals with the principles and rules which determine
whether and, if so, at what point, the defendant's responsibility is to be terminated
short of answering for all those injuries which, but for his negligence, the other would
not have sustained") [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
35. Stacey Allen Carroll, Note, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
Claims: Adding Clarity and Respect for State Sovereignty to the Analysis of Federal
Preemption Defenses, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 797, 802 (2002) (stating that "both plaintiffs and
defendants alike" benefit from an increase in judicial certainty).
36. See infra Part I.A; see also supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
37. Mark P.O. Morford et al., Classical Mythology, at http://www.brandeis.edu/
departments/classics/classl70/myth2a8a.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2003); Leonard C.
Muellner, Divine Children of Zeus, at http://www.brandeis.edu/departments/
classics/classl70/myth2a8a.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).
38. See infra Part I.B.1.
39. See infra Part I.B.I, I.B.2.
40. See infra Part I.B.3.
41. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
2684 [Vol. 71
2003] THE "BUT FOR" TEST 2685
smoothly in tandem, but they are occasionally at complete odds-
offering differing results and leaving courts with no clear guidance as
to which test should control.42
This part traces the background of the "but for" test, and closely
examines its workings, in practice. It then describes the origin of the
"substantial factor" test, and examines the process by which the
standard's acceptance in the First Restatement led to its wide judicial
acceptance. Finally, the Part closely scrutinizes the uses to which
courts have put the growing "substantial factor" doctrine since its
inception.
A. The "But For" Test: Advantages in Theory and Practice
The "but for" inquiry is a hypothetical, counterfactual process.43 It
asks the finder of fact to determine whether the harm would have
come to the plaintiff, had the defendant not acted (or failed to act) in
breach of her duty.44 Nonetheless, the plaintiff need not prove beyond
doubt that the defendant's conduct was a cause of the plaintiff's
injury.45 All that is required is evidence sufficient for a reasonable
juror to conclude that it is more likely than not that the injury was
caused by the defendant's tortious act.46
Professor David Robertson has suggested that this deceptively
simple, seemingly intuitive examination can be best analyzed by
breaking it down into the following five steps.4 7 First, the jury must
identify the plaintiff's injury."a Often this first step is straightforward,
but sometimes the issues can be murky.49 Next, the jury must identify
42. See infra Part I.B.3.
43. David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 Tex. L. Rev.
1765,1770 (1997).
44. Id. at 1771.
45. Prosser, supra note 4, § 41.
46. Id; see Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability and Warranted
Factfinding, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1075 (1996) (discussing the meaning of
"preponderance of the evidence").
47. Robertson, supra note 43, at 1769.
48. Id. at 1769-71.
49. Many jurisdictions have recognized increased risk as a cognizable cause of
action. See, e.g., Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 57 n.47 (Mich. 1990) (finding
for the plaintiff on a "loss of chance" theory, but limiting recovery "to only that
amount of reduced chance of recovery actually caused by the physician's negligent
conduct" (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Herskovits v. Group Health
Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983) (rejecting defense counsel's assertion that the
evidence "must show that [the plaintiff] 'probably' would have had a 51 percent
chance of survival if the hospital had not been negligent," and finding for the plaintiff
on a "loss of chance" theory); see also Chaplin v. Hicks, 1911 K.B. 786 (Eng. C.A.)
(allowing a beauty contestant proportional recovery (in contract) when defendant
wrongfully deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to be chosen as the winner of a
beauty contest); infra Part l.B.3.d. Other jurisdictions have taken this notion further,
including the increased risk brought about by the aggravation of a pre-existing
condition in medical malpractice. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 798 A.2d 67, 78
(N.J. 2002) (stating that "the application of a standard of causation that is more
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the defendant's tortious act or omission.5 ' The remaining three steps
involve linking the two identified elements via counterfactual
analysis-the finder of fact must (a) imagine that the defendant had
not acted tortiously, (b) frame an inquiry as to whether the identified
harm to the plaintiff would have occurred anyway, and (c) answer that
hypothetical question."
Many scholars agree with Professor Robertson's assertion that
"[o]n the matter of factual causation, mainstream and traditional
views are the right views."52  Indeed, the "but for" test's greatest
strength is that it is "both simple enough for everyday application in
lawyers' offices and busy trial courts and at the same time
comprehensive enough to solve the recurrent types of occasionally
quite challenging causation difficulties."53 Because factual cause is "a
matter upon which any layman is quite as competent to sit in
judgment as the most experienced court," it is crucial that the courts
employ a test that is appropriate for use by citizens of all levels of
sophistication.54 Perhaps for this reason, many scholars argue that the
"but for" test's greatest strength is its ease of use by juries.55 Professor
Robertson has observed that "when answering [the "but for" inquiry]
we intuitively refer to our common experience of living on a
populated planet subject to the forces of gravity and nature. It is for
that reason that any layman is quite as competent to answer ordinary
cause-in-fact questions as 'the most experienced court."'5 6 The "but
for" test is uniquely suited to this task."
"The 'but for' test seems to work well with garden-variety examples
of causation.""s In most cases, and in virtually all clear-cut cases, it
will yield the "correct" answer on the question of cause-in-fact 9 If a
plaintiff reads, for example, in the literature of a professional
association of optometrists that its members are qualified to detect
glaucoma, and four members of that association subsequently fail to
detect that disorder, the "but for" test correctly sets the bar for the
flexible than that used in conventional tort claims' [is] appropriate in medical
malpractice cases involving preexistent conditions," (quoting Evers v. Dollinger, 471
A.2d 405, 413 (N.J. 1984)). To the extent that these cases allow recovery for an injury
where factual cause cannot be established by a preponderance of the evidence, they
raise troubling questions both about the "but for" test and the "substantial factor"
analysis which has come to supplement "but for" analysis. See infra Part III.A.I .c.
50. Robertson, supra note 43, at 1770.
51. Id. at 1770-71.
52. Id. at 1766.
53. Id. at 1767.
54. Prosser, supra note 4, § 41.
55. Robertson, supra note 43, at 1769.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawfil
Sufficiency, and Causal Sufficiency, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83, 95 (2001).
59. Id.; Robertson. supra note 43, at 1776 (asserting that "Iriequiring the plaintiff
to prove cause in fact by the but-for test is almost always the right approach").
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plaintiff to prove that the defendant association's tort was a "cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produce[d] the result complained of and without
which the result would not have occurred."6"
In the hard cases, however, where cause-in-fact is not intuitively
clear, the "but for" test can be ineffective. The most glaring example
of this shortcoming involves multiple tortfeasors and a relationship to
the tortious act that has been variously referred to as "over-
determined" causation, "duplicative" causation, and, in the
nomenclature of the Draft Revisions, "multiple sufficient causation."'"
Here, courts will often turn to the "substantial factor" test.
62
In addition to the straightforward, functional nature of the analysis
inherent to the "but for" test, the standard has the weight of its
historical "pedigree" on its side. 63 At least as far back as the mid-
nineteenth century, courts have used the test to seek out the "actual"
cause of harm as the basis for liability. 4 Even after courts severed
factual from proximate causation,65 "early cause-in-fact cases applied
the 'but for' test as the exclusive test" for determining factual
causation.6 The test has survived the innovations of the intervening
decades-virtually every jurisdiction still uses the "but for" test as an
element of the causation inquiry.
B. Supplementing "But For": The "Substantial Factor" Doctrine
1. The Beginning: The "Two Fires" Cases
The "substantial factor" test was given its first judicial articulation
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St.
Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway, In that case, one of the Railway's
engines caused a fire that had destroyed the plaintiff's property.69 The
60. Collins v. Am. Optometric Ass'n, 693 F.2d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations
omitted).
61. See generally Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27 cmt. a, at 68-70; Richard W.
Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735 (1985).
62. See infra Part I.B.3.a.
63. Christopher M. Hohn, Note, Cause-In-Fact in Missouri: A Return to Normalcy,
59 Mo. L. Rev. 947, 953 (1994) (stating that the "but for" test of factual cause has
"ancient roots"); cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 616 (1990) (holding
that mere physical presence is sufficient basis for exercise of in personam jurisdiction
justified by the doctrine's "pedigree," as evidenced in a "formidable body of
precedent").
64. See Horwitz, supra note 3, at 52; Calabresi Interview, supra note 3.
65. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
66. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 780 (Tex. 1995) (Cornyn, J.,
concurring).
67. See Nader, supra note 19, at 16 n.8.
68. 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).
69. 1d. at 46.
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defendant argued, however, that another fire, of unknown origin, had
simultaneously been moving toward the plaintiff's property, propelled
by the wind, and would have destroyed the plaintiff's premises in any
event.71 Since the harm would have occurred even without the
Railway's tortious conduct, the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the
requirements of "but for" causation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding of
liability.72 With neither evaluative comment nor citation to authority,
the court summarized approvingly the trial court's charge to the jury
as including an instruction that liability would be created if the fire
was a "substantial factor in causing plaintiff's damage. ' 73 Thus, with
little fanfare, the Minnesota Supreme Court gently pushed the
snowball down the hill.
70. Id. In fact, it's not clear from the Anderson opinion whether there were a
total of two fires or three. The opinion notes the defendant's assertion that "fires
were burning west and northwest of and were swept by the wind towards plaintiff's
premises." Id. Since the fire set by the defendant was also west of the plaintiff's
property, the defendant might have been referring here to either the fire it had
allegedly set and another of unknown origin, or to two additional fires, not including
the one set by defendant's services. Id. For simplicity, and because this case and those
like it are commonly referred to as "two fires" cases, this Note refers to the fire(s) of
unknown origin in the singular.
71. Id. If the "but for" test were applied in this case, the test would fail because
when any single fire is hypothetically removed from the fact pattern, the other fires
cause the damage anyway-thus neither fire is a "but for" cause. See Charles Kester,
The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science and the Troubles of Translation:
Defining the Proper Role for Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 529,
535 (1995) (stating that in "a merging fires case, strict application of the but for test
would preclude any recovery by [the plaintiff], since neither fire is the but for cause of
the damage to [her] property").
72. Anderson, 179 N.W. at 45-46.
73. Id. at 46. This development, which seemed to loosen the standard of factual
causation, dovetailed nicely with the legal trend toward a bifurcation of causal
analysis. One implication of that divergence was the creation of additional room for a
policy-driven examination of "proximate" cause. Horwitz, supra note 3, at 51-63.
Interestingly, in Palsgraf, Judge Andrews dropped the phrase "substantial factor" into
his discussion of proximate causation with a casualness that implied that the phrase
might be interchangeable with "but for" causation:
Except for the explosion, lMrs. Palsgraf] would not have been injured. We
are told by the appellant in his brief, "It cannot be denied that the explosion
was the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries." So it was a substantial factor
in producing the result-there was here a natural and continuous
sequence-direct connection. The only intervening cause was that instead of
blowing her to the ground, the concussion smashed the weighing machine
which in turn fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space.
And surely, given such an explosion as here, it needed no great foresight to
predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no
greater distance from its scene than was the plaintiff.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 105 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
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2. "Substantial Factor" Rises to Prominence:
The ALI and the Restatement of Torts
The ALI was founded in 1923, just three years after Anderson was
decided.74 The purpose of the movement which resulted in the
formation of the ALI is the subject of some scholarly dispute.75 It is
accepted history that the founders of the Institute included
conservatives and formalists, as well as progressives and those critical
of legal formalism.76 The last of these included those widely known
today as "Legal Realists"77 as well as some who would better be
described simply as legal pragmatists: those who evaluated the law
within the structures of an evolving understanding of society through
sociology, anthropology, and the other "soft" sciences."
The eclectic nature of the views of the Institute's founders was
amply demonstrated in the extended jockeying for position between
the different groups in the early formation efforts." At one early
meeting
[t]he agenda ... identified three goals for the restatement:
clarification, simplification, and "adaptation [of the law] to the
needs of life." The first two goals responded to the oft-repeated
complaints of both progressive and formalist academics, and
practitioners and judges. The third, explicitly reformist goal,
represented the contribution of the progressive-pragmatist
professors.'()
As this record indicates, in its early days the ALI was being pulled in
contradictory directions. Formalists, realists, corporatists, law
professors, practitioners, and judges each had an impact on the
nascent organization."' Inevitably, the product of this diverse group
contained ambiguities.
The ALI's Restatements are not primary authority, but they are
widely considered to be extraordinarily persuasive. This influence
74. Anderson was decided in 1920, and the American Law Institute was founded
in early 1923. Anderson, 179 N.W. at 45; N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A
New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. 55,
64 (1990). Of course, the Restatement of Torts was a substantial project, and was not
officially adopted by the organization until 1934. See First Restatement, supra note 17,
at vii.
75. The conventional view is that the ALI was founded by members of the
Formalist tradition, aspiring to concretely codify the rules of the common law for
posterity -perhaps even leading to the statutory enactment of the Restatements. But
at least one scholar takes issue with this view, arguing that the true founders of the
Institute were pursuing a reformist agenda. See generally Hull, supra note 74.
76. See Hull, supra note 74, at 64-65.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 74-81.




derives from their nature as "restatement[s] of basic legal subjects that
[can] tell judges and lawyers what the law [is]." 2  As such, these
publications represent the product of one of the primary missions of
the organization. 3 Separately, the Institute also engages in "intensive
examination and analysis" which is designed to "culminate[] in a work
product containing extensive recommendations or proposals for
change in the law," such as the Model Penal Code."a These two aims
are not one, however, and the Institute has recently been subject to
criticism for blurring the line between the two."
Nowhere is the philosophical disjunction between the founding
members of the Institute more pronounced than in what subsequently
came to be known as sections 430 through 434 of the First
Restatement. The First Restatement adopted a broad approach to
causation, incorporating a "substantial factor" analysis under its
examination of "legal cause."8 6 If the drafters had sought to clearly
delineate the inquiry into (a) whether or not the defendant's act was a
necessary antecedent ("factual cause") from (b) the policy-driven
analysis of the appropriate scope of the defendant's liability for the
tortious act ("proximate cause"), the mixed message sent by the two
parts of section 432 suggests that these writers were unable to agree
on a single perspective. 7 While subsection (1) endorses the "but for"
test, subsection (2) suggests that the "substantial factor" test is
available when the "but for" test seems to be failing to function
properly (such as in Anderson)." But whether subsection (2) was ever
intended to go beyond the narrow confines of the "two fires" model
has been the subject of much debate.
It is not at all clear that the ALI intended the "substantial factor"
doctrine to offer courts the option of a reduced standard of causation.
In fact, in coining the phrase "substantial factor," the drafters of the
original Restatement seem to have been primarily concerned with
protecting defendants from unlimited liability from the "but for"
results of their tortious acts." The first preliminary draft of the
Restatement certainly considers "but for" to be the threshold test for
82. This is the goal of the Restatements, according to the ALI's website. Am.
Law Inst., About the American Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2003). But see Calabresi interview, supra note 3 (stating that "I paid
more attention to the Restatements as a law school professor than I do since I became
a judge").
83. About the American Law Institute, supra note 82.
84. Id.; see, e.g., Model Penal Code (1962).
85. See supra note 32.
86. First Restatement, supra note 17, §§ 430-34.
87. Restatement (Second), supra note 21, § 432.
88. Dobbs, supra note 5, at 415 (asserting that "Islo far as they rely upon any test
of causation at all when causal issues are embarrassing, lcourts] may invoke the
'substantial factor' test").
89. See generally Preliminary Draft, supra note 34.
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causation, stating on the very first page of the section on "Legal
Cause":
This part of the Restatement deals with the question of the causal
relation necessary to make it just to hold a wrongdoer liable for an
injury which would not have occurred had it not been for his
wrongdoing only in so far as it is important in determining the
existence and extent of liability for... negligent misconduct."°
Accordingly, this preliminary draft asserted that merely satisfying the
"but for" test, while necessary in almost all cases to establish liability,
is not sufficient to do so.9 In the same section, in Comment a, the
draft continues:
The actor's tortious conduct may be a necessary antecedent of
another's injury and yet it may have so slight an effect in bringing it
about that it is revolting to a reasonable sense of justice to regard
the actor as responsible. It is impossible to define the precise extent
to which the actor's conduct must contribute in bringing about
another's injury in order to make it proper to regard it as a
substantial cause thereof and therefore to make it just to hold the
actor responsible for the injury.92
At this early stage of doctrinal development, the separation
between factual and proximate cause was not yet clear.93 The First
Restatement makes no secret of its concern for the potential of
unlimited liability for defendants. But despite the fact that unlimited
liability was a paramount concern in the development of the
"substantial factor" doctrine, scholarly and judicial treatment of that
concern has since been subsumed by the proximate cause inquiry.94
Early cases citing to the Restatement support this view. Citing to a
tentative draft of the First Restatement, the Sixth Circuit held in 1933
that the "substantial factor" doctrine was controlling in Johnson v.
Kosmos Portland Cement Co.9' In that case, the defendant, a barge
owner, negligently failed to maintain the hold of the barge in order to
prevent production of volatile gases and additionally failed to vent the
hold. The vessel was subsequently struck by lightning, and the gases
90. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
91. See id. at 6 (explaining that even in the face of "but for" causation, the court
may limit liability if it believes that its imposition would be "unjust or inexpedient");
id. at 7 (defining "legal cause" as requiring that the "sequence of events ... is such as
to make it just and expedient to hold the actor responsible"). The "substantial factor"
doctrine appears in an embryonic form in the assertion that legal cause must have "a
substantial effect in bringing about the injury." Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
93. See supra notes 3-19 and accompanying text.
94. This is especially interesting to note, given that the current revisions to the
Restatement are being proposed as a check on the growth of the use of the
"substantial factor" doctrine for the plaintiff. See infra Part 1.B.3.
95. 64 F.2d 193,194-95 (6th Cir. 1933).
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ignited, killing the decedents.96  The district court found for the
defendant on proximate causation grounds, but the appellate court
disagreed, citing the Restatement of Torts, and holding that the
defendant's negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing the
explosion. 7 In finding liability, the court articulated exceptions to the
"substantial factor" doctrine, stating in dicta that the "substantial
factor" doctrine does not apply if: (1) the tortious act "merely creates
an incidental condition or situation in which the accident otherwise
caused results in such injury," (2) the act is one "from the commission
of which no generally injurious results can reasonably be foreseen," or
(3) "where a secondary efficient cause intervenes to break the chain of
causation and so becomes the sole proximate cause of the injury.""
Similarly, in 1942, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed
Anderson in Lunde v. National Citizens Bank of Mankato." Here, the
plaintiff was standing within two feet of a negligently maintained glass
door when a gust of wind blew the door open and the glass shattered,
injuring the plaintiff.' Citing both Anderson and Dean Prosser, the
court held that "the fact that some other cause [the wind] operated in
connection with this negligence could not relieve defendants from
liability. The original negligence concurred with another cause, and,
operating at the same moment, produced the injury."""
3. The Restatement (Second) of Torts and Causation Jurisprudence
The ALI revised the Restatement in 1964, but the changes to
sections 430 through 433 were minor."2 The Restatement (Second)
retained the "substantial factor" definition of causation, merely
including the "but for" test as an element of the definition of
"substantial factor. '' 1 3
The most important uses of the "substantial factor" doctrine by
courts since the adoption of the Restatement (Second) have occurred
in cases where alternative theories of liability have been employed.
First, there are the "two fires" cases-those with facts similar to
Anderson. 4 Next are "indeterminate defendant" cases where there is
more than one possible defendant. This area of causation law was
96. Id. at 194.
97. Id. at 196-97.
98. Id. at 197.
99. 6 N.W.2d 809, 810-11 (Minn. 1942); see also supra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text.
100. Lunde, 6 N.W. 2d at 810.
101. Id. (quoting Moore v. Townsend, 76 Minn. 64, 68 (1899)).
102. Restatement (Second), supra note 21; compare First Restatement, supra note
17, §§ 430-33, with Restatement (Second), supra note 21, §§ 430-33.
1)3. Restatement (Second), supra note 21, §§ 430-33.
104. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn.
1920). This type of case is referred to in the Draft Revisions as involving "multiple
sufficient causal sets." Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27, at 68.
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originally addressed in the seminal case Summers v. Tice,"5 but has its
most significant contemporary application in toxic and environmental
torts cases, including asbestos cases and the "market share liability"
cases surrounding the marketing of DES." 6 Additionally, one line of
cases invoking the "loss of chance" doctrine has been heavily
dependent on the rubric of "substantial factor.""' 7 Finally, there are
cases originally intended by the drafters of the First Restatement to be
dealt with by the "substantial factor" doctrine which manifest what
could be termed the "butterfly effect"-where the original tort is
greatly attenuated from the ultimate injury.""
a. "Two Fires" Cases
The strongest argument for the "substantial factor" doctrine can be
found in cases of multiple sufficient causes."' 9 Anderson, discussed
above, is much cited for this principle because it represents an early
emergence of the doctrine's use (pre-dating and informing the First
Restatement), and its facts offer a clear example of multiple sufficient
causation -where two forces acting independently, either of which are
sufficient to cause the harm in question, combine to injure the
plaintiff.'"'
Nonetheless, modern cases abound where the "substantial factor"
doctrine was used to address contemporary concerns. In Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., ' the defendant drug manufacturers were shown
to have manufactured two of the three drugs the plaintiff was
prescribed for a skin disease."2 The plaintiff filed a complaint against
the defendants when she began to experience problems with her
vision." 3 The jury found for the defendant, but the appellate court
reversed citing the Restatement (Second).' The court held that the
trial court had committed reversible error in failing to provide a
"substantial factor" instruction to the jury, reasoning:
Suppose, for example, that the jury found (1) that plaintiff's
blindness was caused by a combination of Aralen and Triquin, and
105. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
106. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973): Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
107. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978) (asserting that it is
"a question for the jury as to whether or not [the] increased risk was a substantial
factor in producing the harm").
108. See infra text accompanying note 197.
109. Robertson, supra note 43, at 1777.
110. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn.
1920); Prosser, supra note 4, § 42.
111. 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (applying Connecticut law).
112. Id. at 419.
113. Id.
114. Id.; Restatement (Second), supra note 21, at § 432.
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(2) that the risk of [disease] did not become known until 1959.
Suppose also that the jury found (3) that there was no breach of the
duty to warn with respect to Aralen, but (4) that defendant gave
inadequate warnings with respect to Triquin. On these facts,
plaintiff would be entitled to recover if the jury found that either
Aralen or Triquin alone would have been sufficient to produce
chloroquine retinopathy, and that Triquin was a "substantial factor"
in producing her injury.1 15
Thus, as is apparent in Basko, despite the fact that the "two fires" rule
was originally devised for a simple case of overdetermination, courts
have found it sufficiently flexible to address the more complex facts of
many contemporary cases.
The "substantial factor" doctrine has also proven helpful to
plaintiffs in tobacco litigation. In Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.," 6 the plaintiff sued the defendant tobacco company after having
smoked approximately one full package of cigarettes a day for over
forty years.' Despite evidence that the plaintiff had primarily
smoked Camel cigarettes, and had only smoked Lucky Strikes (the
defendant's product) when Camel cigarettes were not available, the
court ruled that factual causation had been satisfied.'" Citing to the
Restatement (Second), but without mention of the "but for" test, the
court held that "an act or product is the actual cause of the plaintiff's
injury if the act or product is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm [to the plaintiff].'' 9
b. The Indeterminate Defendant
In Summers v. Tice, 2" the plaintiff, Summers, and the two
defendants went hunting together.' Summers proved that both
defendants negligently fired in the plaintiff's direction.'22 The trial
court found in the plaintiff's favor, despite his inability to prove which
of his hunting companions had been the factual cause of his injury.
The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the burden of
proof in such cases shifts to the defendants. The court reasoned:
They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff. They
brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them
injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve
himself if he can. The injured party has been placed by the
defendants in the unfair position of pointing to which defendant
115. Basko, 416 F.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
116. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Kan. 2002).
117. Id. at 1259.
118. Id. at 1270-71.
119. Id. at 1270 (internal quotations omitted).
120. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
121. Id. at 1-2.
122. Id. at 3.
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caused the harm. If one can escape the other may also and plaintiff
is remediless.
123
The Restatement (Second) adopted this approach, and the Draft
Revisions retain it.2 4 The Draft Revisions explain:
The rationale for shifting the burden of proof to defendants whose
tortious conduct exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm is that, as
between two culpable defendants and an innocent plaintiff, it is
preferable to put the risk of error on culpable defendants rather
than on the innocent plaintiff.
125
The Draft Revisions state that "since the publication of the Second
Restatement in 1965, courts have generally accepted the alternative
liability principle of [section] 433B(3), while fleshing out its limits.' 26
The limits specifically fleshed out here include that: (a) the plaintiff
must sue all of the tortfeasors involved, 27 (b) the tortious act of the
defendants must have increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff,2 ' and
(c) both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion on
the matter of factual causation shift to the defendants. 29
Despite the fact that Summers is not on its surface a causation
case, 3 " the line of cases that begins with Summers extends to some of
the most contentious causation issues of today, most notably toxic and
environmental torts. 3 ' Here too, courts have found use for the
"substantial factor" doctrine. In fact, according to at least one view,
"traditional tort law requires only that the defendant's actions be a
'substantial factor' in bringing about the consequences complained
of.... [T]here has never been a rule that a defendant is not
responsible if his actions contributed less than 50% of the causes of an
. " 1132injury.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 28(b), cmt. e, at 95,118-34.
125. Id. § 28(b) cmt. f, at 119.
126. Id. § 28(b) cmt. e, at 118.
127. Id. § 28(b) cmt. g, at 118-19, 169-71 (observing that when courts in the 1980s
were faced with an onslaught of cases growing out of liability for manufacture of
DES, the "near-universal" response was to rebuff these attempts to invoke alternate
liability because the plaintiff had not joined all potential defendants); see, e.g., Sindell
v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 931 (Cal. 1980); see also Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069, 1082 (N.Y. 1989).
128. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 28(b) cmt. g, at 118-19, 169-71; see, e.g.,
Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1280 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Mississippi law).
129. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 28(b), at 95; see, e.g., Bowman v. Redding &
Co., 449 F.2d 956, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (addressing procedural implications).
130. Note that the Summers opinion found neither that the defendant had been a
"substantial factor" in bringing about the harm, nor that the defendant was
necessarily liable-rather, the burden of proof was simply shifted to the defendant,
creating a rebuttable presumption of liability. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal.
1948).
131. Calabresi Interview, supra note 3.
132. Edward J. Schwartzbauer & Sidney Shindell, Cancer and the Adjudicative
Process: The Interface of Environmental Protection and Toxic Tort Law, 14 Am. J.L.
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In Allen v. United States,3 ' the court noted that "[i]n the pragmatic
world of 'fact' the court passes judgment on the probable. Dispute
resolution demands rational decision, not perfect knowledge."'34
Allen adopted a "substantial factor" test in a very thorough opinion.'35
In rejecting the "but for" test, the court held:
[W]here a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard
which puts an identifiable population group at increased risk, and a
member of that group at risk develops a biological condition which
is consistent with having been caused by the hazard to which he has
been negligently subjected, such consistency having been
demonstrated by substantial, appropriate, persuasive and connecting
factors, a factfinder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused
the condition absent persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the
defendant.'36
Interestingly, in addition to utilizing the "substantial factor" doctrine
to untangle a complicated combination of conventional liability
claims, the Allen court also seemed to analyze the "increased risk" in
terms of the "substantial factor" test."3 7
In Queen City Terminals v. General American Transportation
Corp.,3' the plaintiff-owner of a facility that handled chemical
products sued three defendants who were related in a complex web of
privity for direct and special damages relating to the spillage of toxic
chemicals. 3 ' Considering the matters under a combination of contract
and tort law, the court refrained from even mentioning the "but for"
test, holding simply that the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant's
act had been a "substantial factor" in causing the damages.4 Further,
the court declined to review the application of the "substantial factor"
doctrine de novo, stating that "[t]he determination of whether an
actor's conduct was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's
injury is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact."''
Moreover, in individual cases where defendant identification has
proven difficult or impossible, plaintiffs have argued (sometimes
successfully) for scrapping the "but for" rule altogether, most
notoriously in the DES cases of the 1980s and 1990s. 142 In these cases,
& Med. 1,31-32 (1988).
133. 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th
Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 260.
135. Id. at 415.
136. Id. (first emphasis added).
137. Id.; see also infra Part I.B.3.d for the implications of increased risk on the use
of the "substantial factor" doctrine in "loss of chance" cases in medical malpractice.
138. 653 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 1995).
139. Id. at 667.
140. Id. at 667-68.
141. Id. at 669.
142. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Conley v. Boyle
Drug Co., 570 So. ,2d 275 (Fla. 1990)); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717
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multiple manufacturers of DES, a drug that when taken by pregnant
women was found to have caused birth defects in children, were sued
by the children themselves after a period of time when, in most cases,
it had become impracticable to determine which defendant had
manufactured the particular drugs in question. 14 3  With varying
degrees of confidence, courts implemented a "market share liability"
theory for the determination of damages.'44 Most, like the California
Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, retained at least
some level of commitment to the "but for" test. 145 But at least one
court, the New York Court of Appeals, seemed to altogether jettison
the demand for proof of "but for" causation by either the plaintiff or
the defendant. In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Company, the court held
that "because liability here is based on the over-all risk produced, and
not causation in a single case, there should be no exculpation of a
defendant who, although a member of the market producing DES for
pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's
injury. ' 141
To be sure, the Hymowitz court emphasized that its logic was
developed in response to special circumstances.4 7  Furthermore,
despite a number of subsequent invitations by plaintiffs to adopt the
market share rule to other products, both the New York courts and
the federal courts have thus far declined to extend the rule beyond the
facts of Hymowitz.141 In any event, such an overt rejection of the "but
for" rule by New York's highest court is interesting to note.
(Haw. 1991); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Martin v.
Abbot Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.
1984) (finding liability proportional to the risk created, as measured by market share).
143. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925; Conley, 570 So. 2d at 279.
144. See Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise
Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1978). For examples of DES cases, see Sindell, 607
P.2d at 937 (holding that, after joining the manufacturers of a substantial portion of
DES, the burden of proof could be shifted to the defendants); Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d
at 1071-72 (holding that even those defendants who prove that they did not
manufacture the DES in question were liable under a market share theory).
145. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925-26.
146. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1078-79 (stating that the court was faced with an "unprecedented
identification problem," and that "exceptional circumstances are presented").
148. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001) (gun
manufacturers); Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 794 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1992)
(lead paint pigmentation); N.Y. Tel. Co. v. AAER Sprayed Insulations, Inc., 250
A.D.2d 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (asbestos). For a discussion of the implications of
extending market share liability theory beyond the confines of DES, compare Aaron
Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1379 (2000), with
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Concern for Cause: A Comment on the
Twerski-Sebok Plan for Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun




In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., the fifth Circuit cited
the Restatement (Second), Dean Prosser, and Professors Malone and
Green for its innovative use of the "substantial factor" doctrine in
asbestos litigation.'49 In that case, the plaintiff worked with industrial
insulation for over thirty years. Over that period, he was exposed to a
great deal of asbestos manufactured by the defendants.5 " At the end
of his average work day, Borel was covered with asbestos dust. He
asserted that he "blowed [sic] this dust out of [his] nostrils by handfuls
at the end of the day. ... [I]t is impossible to get rid of all of it. Even
your clothes just stay dusty continually unless you blow it off with an
air hose."''
The plaintiff was unable to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence which defendant manufactured the asbestos which gave him
asbestosis and mesothelioma.' -2 The court acknowledged that "it is
impossible, as a practical matter, to determine with absolute certainty
which particular exposure to asbestos dust [and therefore the actions
of which particular defendant] resulted in injury to" the plaintiff.'53
But without specifically citing Summers, the court noted:
It is undisputed, however, that [the plaintiff] contracted asbestosis
from inhaling asbestos dust and that he was exposed to the products
of all the defendants on many occasions. It was also established that
the effect of exposure to asbestos dust is cumulative, that is, each
exposure may result in an additional and separate injury. We think,
therefore, that on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence the
jury could find that each defendant was the cause in fact of some
injury to [the plaintiff]. 54
Thus, using a similar logic to that found in Summers, the Borel court
used "substantial factor" language to find liability where "but for" was
unable to serve. 55
Borel was a "landmark" case, the first example of the application of
the "substantial factor" doctrine to asbestos injury.'56 The first,
149. 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973).
150. Id. at 1081-82.
151. Id. at 1082.
152. Id. at 1083. "Mesothelioma is a rare form of cancer.., which involves the
mesothelial cells of an organ, usually the lungs, heart or abdominal organs."
Mesothelioma and Asbestosis Information Resource, Common Questions, at
http://www.asbestosismesothelioma.com/common.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
Asbestosis is a "serious lung inflammation caused by asbestos exposure that could
lead to Mesothelioma." Common Questions, at http://www.asbestosismesothelioma.
com/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
153. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1094.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Brian M. DiMasi, Comment, The Threshold Level of Proof of Asbestos
Causation: The "Frequency, Regularity and Proximity Test" and a Modified Summers
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perhaps, but far from the last-Borel has been cited with approval in
every circuit.'57 Clearly, the "substantial factor" test is well ensconced
in asbestos law.15 8
d. "Loss of Chance"
Under certain conditions, the "loss of chance" doctrine allows
recovery for "a heightened risk of death or injury" despite the
plaintiff's inability to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant had caused the injury in question.1 59  One line of the
"loss of chance" cases relies heavily on the "substantial factor"
doctrine. 1 " Those courts that allow complete recovery to the plaintiff
on a showing of an increase in the risk of harm generally rely on
"substantial factor" causation doctrine to solidify their analysis. 6 '
Interestingly, these opinions also highlight difficulties which courts
often have in separating the "substantial factor" doctrine from "but
for" causation and "loss of chance" theory.'62
Consider a patient who undergoes a medical procedure with a less
than fifty percent chance of success. The procedure is then
complicated by medical malpractice, which further reduces the
patient-plaintiff's chance of survival. In these circumstances, when
courts believe they are limited to a choice between the "but for" test
(which can be quite harsh from the perspective of the plaintiff on
v. Tice Theory of Burden-Shifting, 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 735, 741 (1995).
157. Borel has been followed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994);
King v. Armstrong World Indus., 906 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1990); Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980); Van Cleef v.
Aeroflex Corp., 657 F.2d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1981); Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d
1453, 1470-71 (10th Cir. 1988); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981). It has also been cited with approval by the First, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits. See, e.g., Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1232 (1st Cir.
1990); Needham v. White Labs., Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1981); Karjala v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975). Even in the
Second and Third Circuits, where the Courts of Appeals have not expressly condoned
Borel, district courts have nonetheless cited to it as persuasive authority. See, e.g., Del
Cid v. Beloit Corp., 901 F. Supp. 539, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Amader v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1033, 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
158. See DiMasi, supra note 156, at 741.
159. See Paul Speaker, The Application of the Loss of Chance Doctrine in Class
Actions, 21 Rev. Litig. 345, 345 (2001).
160. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978). The court stated:
Once a plaintiff has introduced evidence that a defendant's negligent act or
omission increased the risk of harm to a person in plaintiff's position, and
that the harm was in fact sustained, it becomes a question for the jury as to




162. Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 431 A.2d 920, 923-24 (Pa. 1981); Pipe v.
Hamilton, 56 P.3d 823,825-27 (Kan. 2002).
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these facts1 63), or the "substantial factor" doctrine (which can be
intolerably vague from the defendant's point of view"M), the results
rarely achieve a balance between legal and societal efficiency on the
one hand and an intuitive sense of justice on the other.'65
The following hypothetical may be illustrative: A is to undergo
heart surgery, which has a forty-five percent chance of success-odds
that A has accepted as his best chance of survival. Due to conceded
malpractice, A's chance of survival is reduced dramatically to five
percent. A dies. 6 ' Under the ordinary "but for" test, combined with
163. See, e.g.. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971),
overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio
1996). In Cooper, the plaintiff showed evidence supporting the claim that the patient
had possessed "a chance ... maybe some place around 50%" of survival with surgery,
but that the defendant had negligently discharged him several hours prior to his death
without taking his vital signs. Id. at 104 (emphasis in original). The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant on the issue of causation, and both the
intermediate appellate court and the state Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the
issue of proximate cause can be submitted to a jury only if there is sufficient evidence
showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment and surgery the patient probably would
have survived." Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
164. See e.g., Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1993).
In a case of first impression for the Texas court, the plaintiff sued the defendant
hospital for failure to diagnose cervical cancer, leading to a loss of a less-than-fifty
percent chance of survival. Id. The Texas Supreme Court declined to adopt a "loss of
chance" rule, explaining that while the law "always settles for some lower threshold of
certainty" than absolute proof, "Ibielow reasonable probability, however, we do not
believe that a sufficient number of alternative explanations and hypotheses for the
cause of the harm are eliminated to permit a judicial determination of responsibility."
Id. at 405. The court went on. stating:
Imperfect as it may be, our legal system attempts to ascertain facts to
arrive at the truth. To protect the integrity of that goal, there must be some
degree of certainty regarding causation before a jury may determine as fact
that a ... defendant did cause the plaintiff's injury and should therefore
compensate the plaintiff in damages. To dispense with this requirement is to
abandon the truth-seeking function of the law.
Id. (quoting Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44,66 (Mich. 1990)).
165. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 Yale L.J. 1353, 1368-69
n.53 (1981 ).
166. There is an argument to be made, of course, that there is no principled reason
for drawing the line for recovery at plaintiffs who have actually suffered the harm
sought to be avoided (in the case of this example, a plaintiff who has suffered some
reduction in her chance of survival, but has nonetheless survived). But as part of his
excellent overview of the "loss of chance" doctrine, Professor David A. Fischer offers
a neat reply to this concern. The plaintiff who does not suffer the ultimate harm
cannot recover because:
lUjsing hindsight, we now know that the portion of the chance that
defendant destroyed had no real value because plaintiff did not need it to
obtain the benefit .... The chance lacked value because it was not a true
chance at all. Chance is a concept that arises out of a lack of information.
We think that careless shooting in the vicinity of another person creates a
risk of harming that person. But if we had full information, including the
precise location of the person and the precise direction of the bullet, we
would know that the true chance of harm is either 100 percent or 0 percent.
IThe patient's survivall was like shooting a bullet that missed. We know in
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ordinary "preponderance of the evidence" rules, A's survivors will
invariably recover nothing.'67
But assuming a thousand such cases, and accepting the foregoing
statistics as true, 400 of the 950 deaths were actually caused by the
malpractice. The problem, perhaps obviously, is the difficulty of
identifying which 400 of the thousand in question were actually
harmed by the defendant.
In 1981, Professor Joseph King published an article that has since
been cited by virtually every major opinion invoking what has come to
be known as the "loss of chance" doctrine.6 Professor King argues:
Loss of a [less than fifty percent] chance should be compensable
even if the chance is not better than even, and it should be
recognized and valued as such rather than as an all-or-nothing
proposition. Any other rule fails to satisfy the goals of tort law.' 69
King also asserts that treating causation as an all-or-nothing
proposition is "arbitrary" and "irrational," and that it "subverts the
deterrence objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of
conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses.'' 170
Professor King supports his argument with a hypothetical involving
two jars of coins.' The finder of fact has estimated that the first jar
contains forty pennies, with the likelihood that it contains more than
forty pennies equal to the possibility that it contains fewer."2 A
plaintiff who lost a jar of unknown value could not be judicially
compensated; such compensation would require too much
speculation."7 In this example, however, we know (by the
assumptions of the hypothetical) that the possibility of the jar
containing more than forty pennies precisely offsets the possibility
that it contains fewer.7 4 Thus, the contents of this jar is compensable
in the event of loss-it is worth forty cents.175
The second jar contains sixty coins that are valueless, and forty that
are worth one dollar each.17 ' The chance to draw one coin from the
hindsight that our estimate of chance was wrong.
David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 605,
619 (2001).
167. Dobbs, supra note 5, at 434-35.
168. See generally King, supra note 165; see, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Cmty.
Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 615 (Ariz. 1984), Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 828
(Mont. 1985); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 591 (Nev. 1991); Scafidi v.
Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 407 (N.J. 1990).
169. King, supra note 165, at 1376.
170. Id. at 1377.
171. Id. at 1376-77.







jar-a forty percent chance of drawing a coin that is worth a dollar-is
also clearly worth forty cents:
The possibility that the chance is worth more than forty cents is
discounted by the identical chance that it is worth less than forty
cents. The forty percent chance is a final estimate, already
discounted, just like the estimate of value of the contents of the first
jar. The decision to compensate the former estimate and not the
latter makes no more sense than an arbitrary holding with respect to
the first jar that its loss would not be compensated unless it was
estimated to contain at least fifty-one coins.
17 7
Under the "all or nothing" view of causation, this narrow analysis is
precisely the state of the law.'78 A plaintiff who is estimated to have
lost a fifty-one percent chance of survival is compensated for the full
value of the loss, while another plaintiff who has lost a forty-nine
percent chance gets nothing.
Professor King's article has been influential. 179  In Herskovits v.
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, the plaintiff offered
evidence that defendant's late diagnosis of the decedent had reduced
the decedent's chance of survival from thirty-nine to twenty-five
percent. 8" Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court of Washington
reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, holding that the plaintiff need not show a fifty-one percent
chance that the decedent would have survived absent the defendant's
malpractice. 8' While the majority did not base its decision on the
"loss of chance" doctrine, the concurrence signed by three of the five-
justice majority did, expressly rejecting the majority's reasoning. 2
Quoting extensively from Professor King's article, the concurrence
concluded that "the loss of a less than even chance [was] an actionable
injury."'8 3 The concurrence then further cited King on the question of
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. A number of jurisdictions, however, have expressly rejected the "loss of
chance" doctrine. See, e.g., Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958, 964-65 (10th Cir. 1986)
(applying New Mexico law); Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1020
(Fla. 1984); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Idaho
1992); Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138, 141 (I11. App. Ct. 1986); Watson v. Med.
Emergency Servs. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Fennell v. S.
Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 214 (Md. 1990); Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d
882, 888 (Miss. 1987); Pillsbury-Flood v. Portsmouth Hosp., 512 A.2d 1126, 1129-30
(N.H. 1986); Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995); Kramer v. Lewisville
Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397,407 (Tex. 1993).
180. 664 P.2d 474,475 (Wash. 1983).
181. Id. at 479.
182. Rather than follow Professor King's logic to its conclusion, allowing for
proportional recovery, the majority cited Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978),
as support for the position that section 323 of the Restatement (Second) serves "as
authority to relax the degree of certitude normally required of plaintiff's evidence in
order to make a case for the jury." Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring).
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damages, concluding that justice would be best served by the
imposition of proportional damages.'84
In Falcon v. Memorial Hospital, the plaintiff offered expert
testimony that the patient would have had a 37.5% opportunity of
surviving the medical accident that had caused her death.'85 The trial
court dismissed the complaint on causation grounds.'86 The Supreme
Court of Michigan held that the plaintiff need only establish that the
omitted procedure had the potential for improving the patient's
recovery or preventing her death, and that the resulting injury was her
lost chance of recovery. 18 7 The majority opinion explained that the
holding applied only to a "limited class of cases" where a defendant
had taken responsibility for protecting the plaintiff from "a particular
harm" and then tortiously increased the risk of that harm.'88 The
court reasoned:
Patients engage the services of doctors, not only to prevent
disease or death, but also to delay death and to defer or ameliorate
the suffering associated with disease or death. If the trier of fact
were to decide, on the basis of expert testimony, that the
undertaking of the defendant physician included the implementation
of tasks and procedures that, in the case of [the plaintiff], would
have enabled the physician and other medically trained persons,
who were present at the time of delivery, to provide her, in the event
of the medical accident that occurred, an opportunity to survive the
accident, a failure to do so was a breach of the understanding or
undertaking.8 9
Thus, Falcon and the jurisdictions which follow it use Professor King's
theory to avoid the question of the standard of causation by redefining
the injury and proportionally reducing recovery, while allowing
compensation to plaintiffs who might otherwise be unable to prevail.
But some courts have cross-pollinated Professor King's original
argument with the "substantial factor" doctrine. 9" Thus in Roberson
v. Counselman,'9' on a showing that the defendant's malpractice had
been a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injury, the
court held that the plaintiff should be allowed complete recovery.' 92
184. Id.
185. 462 N.W.2d 44, 45 (Mich. 1989). This case was subsequently superseded by
statute. See Blair v. Hutzel Hosp., 552 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. 1996).
186. Id. at 45-46.
187. Id. at 52.
188. Id. at 51 (quoting Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 608 (Ariz.
1984)).
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 1978)
191. 686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984).
192. Id. at 160 (characterizing Cooper as "extreme" and remanding for
consideration under the "loss of chance" doctrine).
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Finally, in an approach many scholars find problematic, many
courts have simultaneously utilized (a) the "loss of chance" concept,
(b) the "substantial factor" doctrine, and (c) section 323 of the
Restatement (Second), in order to allow full recovery. 9 3 As the Draft
Revisions point out, section 323 of the Restatement (Second) is
included in a discussion of duty, not causation. 9 4 The Reporters'
Notes for the Draft Revisions express concern that the "increased
risk" language in this section has been misused in these
circumstances. 95
e. The "Butterfly Effect"
As previously discussed, the initial impetus for adopting the
"substantial factor" doctrine was to limit the liability of a tortfeasor
for damages that were too remotely connected to the original
wrong.9 '6 As one court has noted:
It has been observed that all events on Earth are so interrelated
that "a butterfly's wingbeat in the Amazon can spawn a hurricane in
the Caribbean." However, between the hugely attenuated
connection between the butterfly's liability and the direct
connection of someone who directly impacts another as the final
physical cause of harm, there exists a level of intermediate causation
which our law recognizes as a legal cause, nonetheless.' 97
Accordingly, a number of jurisdictions use the "substantial factor"
doctrine as a "but for"-plus test.' At least one scholar believes that
the ALl's proposal would "properly move" the treatment of these
types of cases into a separate section on proximate cause. 99
II. STANDING BETWEEN THE BRAMBLE BUSHES: "BUT FOR"
VERSUS "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR"
As a result of the jurisprudential evolution described in Part I,
modern courts are now presented with a clear choice between the
"but for" and "substantial factor" tests-each legitimately claiming
193. See, e.g., Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin. 584 A.2d 888, 894 (Pa. 1990); Hamil, 392 A.2d
at 1283.
194. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. n, at 67-68.
195. Id.; see infra Part lII.A.l.c.
196. Preliminary Draft, supra note 34, Foreword.
197. Brim v. Wertz, 35 Pa. D. & C.4th 277, 285 n.5 (1996).
198. See, e.g., Colosi v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-310V,
2002 U.S. Claims LEXIS 312, at *6 (Ct. Cl. Oct. 30, 2002) (holding that plaintiff must
not only show "but for" causation, "but also that the Itortious act] was a substantial
factor in bringing about her injury"); Bell v. Sec. of the Dep't Health & Human
Servs., No. 99-128V, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 23, at *28 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 6, 2001) (ruling
that the plaintiff "must not only show that but for the [wrongful act], he or she would
not have had the injury, but also that the lwrongful act] was a substantial factor in
bringing about his or her injury").
199. Calabresi Interview, supra note 3.
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broad acceptance in case law, and offering deep and layered
philosophical support. This part closely examines the strengths and
weaknesses first of the "but for" test'21z ' and then of the "substantial
factor" test."" Finally, this part describes the changes to the
Restatement (Second) suggested by the proponents of the Draft
Revisions. 22
A. Criticism of the "But For" Test
Despite its widespread acceptance, the "but for" test has not lived
its long life without criticism. 203 The vast majority of this criticism falls
into two categories: (1) the "but for" test is under-inclusive, generally
providing valid positive results but occasionally creating false
negatives, and (2) the "but for" test's reliance on counterfactual
analysis compromises its legitimacy as a credible means of resolving
the causation inquiry. 2 0 4
1. Underinclusivity
Courts and scholars alike widely acknowledge that the "but for"
test creates anomalies in circumstances of multiple sufficient
causation,1 5 where (a) an injury has more than one cause, and (b)
more than one of the causes, by itself, would have been sufficient to
200. See infra Part II.A.
201. See infra Part II.B.
202. See infra Part II.
203. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151,
160-61 (1973) (arguing that the "but for" test is flawed because it treats too many
conditions as causes); Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush, supra note 1
(arguing that the "but for" test is underinclusive, and offering a modified NESS test as
a replacement). It may be that this perspective is more in keeping with the intention
of the drafters of the original Restatement. See supra Part l.B.3.e.
204. It is also interesting to note that some courts have disregarded the "but for"
test in cases where it would be overly inclusive. See, e.g., Connellan v. Coffey, 187 A.
901, 903. (Conn. 1936) (holding that "[i]f the chain of causation ... includes an act or
omission which... is or becomes of no consequence in the results or so trivial as to be
a mere incident of the operating cause, it is not such a factor as will impose liability
for those results"); Huey v. Milligan 175 N.E.2d 698, 701 (Ind. 1961) (holding that
under contributory negligence doctrine, only negligence which "directly or
proximately contributed to the injury" would function as a bar to plaintiff's recovery);
Golden v. Lerch Bros., 281 N.W. 249, 252 (Minn. 1938) (finding that the "factual
situation utterly fails to establish that [the defendant's] acts or failure to act was a
material element or substantial factor in the happening of the harm to plaintiff"
(emphasis added)). In general, though, these concerns are addressed in
contemporary causation analysis under the rubric of proximate cause. See supra notes
3-19 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998)
(applying Connecticut law); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir.
1969) (applying Connecticut law); Vincent v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847,
854 (Alaska 1993); see also H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honor6, Causation in the Law 124
(1959); Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Corsequences, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 941, 968 (2001).
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cause the plaintiff's harm? 6 Furthermore, in cases of medical
malpractice, where the plaintiff has lost a less-than-fifty percent
chance of a successful outcome, the "but for" test has often been
found wanting.2117
Clearly, the traditional test does not neatly resolve all causal
questions. If two fires, either of which would have been sufficient to
destroy the plaintiff's property, combine to destroy the property in
question;211 1 if a horse is startled by the noise of two motorcyclists,
where the noise made by either of them separately would have
startled the horse sufficiently to cause him to bolt;201 or if two polluters
each contribute sufficient pollution to poison the same lake.211 '
Counterfactual analysis would lead the factfinder in these instances to
exonerate both defendants, on the grounds that each could assert that
the harm would have come to the plaintiff regardless of its own
individual act, thereby leaving the plaintiff without a remedy. 2,I
The retributive aims of tort law are deeply offended by such
results. 212 Furthermore, the argument has been cogently made that
this result can afford an unjustifiable windfall to defendants. 213
Clearly, two culpable defendants should not both escape liability,
merely on the basis of a rote incantation of the "but for" rule in
combination with an assertion of another defendant's tortious
behavior.214
206. See Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27.
207. See, e.g., Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 828 (Mont. 1985); Herskovitz
v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 477-79 (Wash. 1983). For a discussion of the
"loss of chance" doctrine, see supra Part l.B.3.d.
208. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45,
45-46 (Minn. 1920); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914 (Wis.
1927).
209. Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902).
210. Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 731-32 (Tex.
1952).
211. Peter Cane, Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and Tte Law 95-97 (6th ed.
1999) (asserting the "unfairness" of this result); Dobbs, supra note 5, at 415 (arguing
that a strict application of the "but for" test in such cases "leads to a result that is
almost always condemned as violating both an intuitive sense of causation, and good
legal policy").
212. James E. Viator, Note, When Cause-In-Fact is More than a Fact. The Malone-
Green Debate on The Role of Policy in Determining Factual Causation in Tort Law, 44
La. L. Rev. 1519, 1531 (1984) ("Clearly, to permit the multiple defendants to escape
liability by endlessly passing the hot-potato of sufficient cause back and forth between
them would offend the principle of retribution.").
213. For the argument that the "but for" test creates a windfall by relieving
independent, causally adequate tortfeasors see Thomas A. Eaton, Causation in
Constitutional Torts, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 443, 460-61 (1982).
214. Id.
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2. What If? The Counterfactual Hypothetical
The "but for" inquiry relies on the imagination of the factfinder for
an analysis of probabilities involving "facts" that never happened.
Professor Mark Grady explains:
[C]ause-in-fact analysis is a hypothetical reconstruction of how
events would have turned out if something would have been
different.... [T]he court asks "what if?" If there had been no
negligence would the accident have happened anyway? ... In short,
cause-in-fact analysis is both hypothetical and counterfactual
analysis. 21
5
Criticism of this approach challenges the advisability of the
counterfactual hypothetical, as well as both its psychological and
philosophical legitimacy.
a. Advisability
According to Professor Leon Green, "[tiests of this character have
the same vice as any 'if,' or any analogy. They take the eye off the
ball. ' '216 The "ball" in this instance is the tortious act, which should be
the focus of the causal inquiry.217 The "but for" test instead "takes the
focus off the defendant's conduct and goes abroad for other causes. "218
Indeed, Professor Green goes further:
In no case does [the "but for" test] present the issue to be
determined. It sends the inquirer back to discover if the result could
have happened without the defendant's participation.... Such an
inquiry at this point is vicious.., it presents an inquiry impossible of
determination. 2 1
9
According to Professor Green, the "but for" test is compromised by
the fact that it is an analogy-the counterfactual hypothetical can
never be reliably determined, and therefore encourages the factfinder
to make a policy judgment under the guise of a causal inquiry.22
Professor Wayne Thode agrees, denouncing the "drawbacks and...
lack of rationality" of the "but for" test because "it focuses the jury's
attention on speculation about what might have happened rather than
on the cause in fact problem of 'what happened.' ' 221 Professor Thode
215. Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 Iowa L. Rev.
363, 392 (1984) (citation omitted).
216. Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev.
543, 556 (1962).
217. Id. at 557.
218. Id.
219. Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev.
601, 605 (1929) (citation omitted).
220. Id.
221. E. Wayne Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine
Cause In Fact, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 423, 431 (1968).
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argues that courts use counterfactual analyses in conjunction with the
"but for" test as a means to implement policies, rather than to
determine factual causation. 22  Given the fact that contemporary
jurisprudence has moved policy analysis to the question of proximate
cause, if Professors Green and Thode are correct, then the "but for"
test has little claim to legitimacy as even an element of the inquiry into
factual causation. 223
b. Psychological Legitimacy
In addition to those scholars who argue that the law is merely
misguided in its use of counterfactuals, there is an increasing body of
work in the field of psychology which casts doubt on whether
factfinders use a hypothetical approach to reach conclusions at all. 224
These scholars question the nature of the relationship between
intuitive counterfactual analysis and intuitive causal determinations. 25
Professor Barbara A. Spellman and Alexandra Kincannon
conducted a survey of psychological studies examining the
"mutability" of various elements of a story under counterfactual
analysis. 22' The "mutable" element of a story is that which subjects
are most likely to change when asked to complete an "if only"
sentence that will change the outcome, i.e., "if only she hadn't had so
much to drink before getting in the car," she'd be alive today.2 ' By
"mutability," the authors refer to the likelihood that a subject will
choose to change a particular element of the story when asked to
construct a counterfactual hypothetical with a differing result. 25 The
researchers operated on the assumption that the event that the subject
thought was the most "mutable" could be determined by seeing which
proposed mutation the subject wrote down first.229
222. Id. at 430-3 1.
223. See Dobbs, supra note 5, at 409 (asserting the need for a separation between
the factual inquiry and policy analysis).
224. See, e.g., Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between
Counterfactual ("But For") and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and
Implications for Jurors' Decisions, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 241 (2001).




229. Id. at 243-44. For example:
Early empirical support for the belief came from a study in which subjects
read a story about a woman who was taken out to dinner by her boss. The
boss orders dinner for both of them, but the dish contains an ingredient-
wine-to which the woman is allergic. She eats the dish, gets sick, and dies.
In both conditions of the experiment the boss had considered ordering
something else: In one condition (one-wine), the other dish did not contain
the fatal ingredient; in the other condition (two-wine), the other dish also
contained wine. Subjects were asked to list four things that could have been
different in the story to prevent the woman's death (mutation task) and to
rate how much of a causal role the boss's decision to order that dish played
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Based on their research, Spellman and Kincannon argue that jurors
who are asked to engage in hypothetical analysis may tend to be
influenced by whether the events being "mutated" by the proposed
counterfactual hypothetical are (1) unusual under the circumstances;
(2) closely related to the focus of the story being created for the
factfinder; (3) "controllable" events, rather than "uncontrollable"
ones; or (4) "immoral" events, rather than "moral" ones.230
Additionally, events that come later in the "story" have been shown
to be more "mutable" than earlier ones, and "[i]f the events form a
causal chain in which the earlier events cause the later ones, then the
first will be more mutable; if the events form a temporal chain in
which the events are independent, then the last will be more
mutable. 231
There were dramatically different results to these experiments
when subjects were presented with circumstances of multiple
sufficient causation versus when they were given circumstances best
described as multiple necessary causes. 2  In gathering data, Professor
Spellman and Ms. Kincannon used the following hypothetical:
Reed hates Smith and wants to kill him. West also hates Smith
(for an entirely different reason) and also wants to kill him. One
day Reed shoots Smith in the head. At the exact same instant, West
shoots Smith in the heart. Smith dies. The coroner says that either
shot alone would have been enough to kill Smith.233
Subjects were divided into two groups: one group was given the
above facts (multiple sufficient causes), while the story told to the
other group changed the last sentence-the coroner states that neither
shot alone would have killed Smith (changing the story into one of
multiple necessary causes).234 In the first situation, the "but for" test
utterly fails to place blame on either party; in the second, it is clear
that both Reed and West were "but for" causes of Smith's death.235
in her death. Subjects in the one-wine condition-where the alternative
choice did not contain wine-were more willing to mutate the selection of
the dish and rated the boss's decision as more causal.
Id. at 249.
230. Id. at 244.
231. Id. at 245.
232. In the nomenclature of the Draft Revisions, multiple sufficient causes occur
where there are two forces, operating independently, and each is sufficient to cause
the harm. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27, at 68. Alternatively, multiple
necessary causes are members of a causal set which are in themselves necessary to
cause the harm, even if they are insufficient to do so by themselves. Id. at 73. Under
the logic of the Draft Revisions, the latter are factual causes by virtue of the "but for"
test, while the former are covered under the exception outlined by § 27. Id. § 26 cmt. i,
at 37-38, 56.
233. Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 224, at 251.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 251-52.
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On the question of which character's behavior (Reed's, West's, or
both) to "mutate" for the "if only" analysis, the results showed a
predictable divide in the perceived need for change to achieve a
different result. 21 In the sufficient causation group, sixty-eight
percent saw the need to alter both Reed's and West's actions to save
Smith's life; and in the necessary causation group, seventy-one percent
hypothetically changed only one character's behavior.237
Despite the likely predictions of advocates of the "but for" test,
when asked to assign jail time based on causation in the two scenarios,
the results did not vary on the basis of whether or not the act was a
"but for" cause of the harm.238 In fact, results of the experiment
showed subjects to consider Reed and West as significantly more
causal under the sufficient circumstances, where an individual
mutation would have no effect, than under the necessary scenario,
where a single mutation could have avoided the result. 23
In order to address concerns that the malevolent intent contained in
the above hypothetical was an undue influence on the results, the
authors conducted an otherwise similar experiment using a
hypothetical involving a fire simultaneously "caused" by two sources,
one natural and one negligent. 2  The results were virtually
identical. 24 ' The authors concluded that "[s]ubjects are quite willing to
attribute causality to events that, when mutated, do not change the
outcome," and therefore that "subjects are not using 'but for'
reasoning to attribute causality in these cases. "242
Similarly, Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that "the truth-
values of counterfactuals are affected by matters having to do with
what is customary and what is expected, for they influence what we
are likely to hold fixed in considering a counterfactual," thus
compromising the counterfactual analysis as a tool for ascertaining the
factual cause, devoid of moral and or policy considerations. 243 Most
compellingly, she argues that "but for" analysis of omissions raises
236. Id. at 252.




241. Id. at 254. When told a story of multiple sufficient causation (i.e., either fire
alone would have caused the whole building to burn), most subjects "mutated" the
involvement of both actors (forty-six percent to seventeen percent), and when told a
story of multiple necessary causes (i.e., each fire alone would have only caused half
the building to burn), most subjects "mutated" only one of the actors (fifty percent to
twenty-eight percent). More significant, when asked to assign causation, subjects
assigned more causality to the wind and the lightning in the "sufficient" scenario,
where hypothetically changing it would have made no difference, than in the
"necessary" hypothetical, where its absence would have changed the resultant harm.
Id.
242. Id. at 254.
243. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Causality and Rights: Some Preliminaries, 63 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 471, 483-84 (1987).
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troubling questions about counterfactuals in general.2 44 Professor
Thomson uses her own hypothetical: Jones, a signalman, fails to pull
the lever to switch a train's tracks.2" The train subsequently has a
head-on collision.246  Did Jones cause the accident? Professor
Thomson reasons:
Jones failed to pull the lever. A fortiori, he did not pull the lever.
Did his not pulling the lever cause the crash? None of us pulled the
lever in fact; did your not pulling the lever cause the crash? The
reply most commonly made here is that Jones was under a duty to
pull the lever, and you were not. (Hence his not pulling it is a failure
to pull it, whereas your not pulling it is not.) But how could the
question whether Jones was under a duty to pull the lever matter to
the question whether his not pulling it caused the crash? What has
morality to do with the question whether one thing caused
another? 24
7
Professor Thomson urges that she is not asserting that "these
questions have no answers," but only that there do not seem to be any
"in the offing. '248 In short, she believes that these questions have not
been "taken as seriously as they should be. 249
c. Philosophical Legitimacy
In Causation in Tort Law, Professor Wright asserts that "efforts
[including the "but for" test] to articulate a comprehensive, factual
test of actual causation have failed repeatedly., 250 He attributes this
failure, at least in part, to the counterfactual, hypothetical nature of
the test.25 As a result, he asserts, "the hypothetical nature of the but
for inquiry necessarily involves or at least invites introduction of
policy considerations into a supposedly factual inquiry. "252
244. Id. at 495.
245. Id. at 494.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 495. This passage is an interesting, if unintended, foreshadowing of the
ALI's renunciation of the use of § 323 of the Restatement (Second) to reduce the
standard of causation in "loss of chance" cases. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26
cmt. n, at 67-68. The Draft Revisions point out that the principle contained in § 323
of the Restatement (Second) is relevant only to the question of duty, not causation.
Id. § 26, at 67. Given this argument, one might be forgiven for challenging the ALI
drafters as to how a duty analysis (which, as Professor Thomson points out here, is
inherent to the factual causation inquiry in cases involving tortious omissions) fits into
their proposal to firmly commit the ALl to the "but for" test in all cases, both those
involving torts of commission and those of omission. See infra text accompanying
notes 358-61.
248. Thomson, supra note 243, at 495.
249. Id.
250. Wright, supra note 61, at 1774.




Professor Wright offers a proposal to modify the "but for" test,
turning it around and focusing its inquiry on actual occurrences rather
than on hypothetical counterfactuals." 3 Building on the work of H.L.
A. Hart and A.M. Honor6's Causation in the Law, Professor Wright
proposes a test which he asserts "captures the essential meaning of the
concept of causation" '254 and is "applicable to the entire spectrum of
causation cases." '255 The Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set
("NESS") test asks the factfinder to work backward (from the
perspective of the "but for" test), and inquire as to whether the
candidate for factual cause was a necessary element of the set of
causes that actually led to the plaintiff's injury.256 In this way, factual
cause can be determined without resort to hypotheticals and the
attendant impact of inevitable policy considerations by the
factfinder" 7
In their criticism of Professor Wright's NESS test, which replaces
the counterfactual hypothetical of the "but for" test with an analysis
of each element for "causal sufficiency," Professors Richard Fumerton
and Ken Kress assert that the analysis underlying the NESS test is
itself circular."' Moreover, rather than simply criticizing the NESS
test, the authors go further-they maintain that the "but for" test for
causation may be the best support that philosophy can supply to the
law, arguing in part:
Philosophers have long recognized that there is an intimate
connection among the concepts of causal connection, lawful
connection, and the relation expressed by contingent counterfactual
(subjunctive) conditionals .... The trick has been to get a
philosophically adequate account of one of these concepts that does
not presuppose an understanding of either of the other two so that
one could then employ it in saying something illuminating about the
remaining two. It has not been an easy trick to accomplish .... In
any event, if the law is waiting for philosophers to offer something
better than a pre-philosophical grasp of what is involved in one thing
causing another, the law had better be very patient indeed." 9
Thus, in rebutting Professor Wright's criticism of the "but for" test,
Professors Fumerton and Kress not only argue that the standard is the
best test available, but that it is likely to be the best possible.26
Therefore, according to these authors, Professor Wright's theory is
incapable of addressing some cases of "causal preemption," unless he
can "come up with a way to distinguish lawful (or law-like) sufficiency
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1789.
255. Id. at 1788.
256. Id. at 1776.
257. Id.
258. Furnerton & Kress, supra note 58 at 83, 102.
259. Id. at 104-05.
260. Id.
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from causal sufficiency without relying on the concept of causation, a
task that has eluded all philosophers to date." ''
B. Criticism of the "Substantial Factor" Doctrine
As one scholar has noted: "[t]he problem with the substantial factor
formula as a test of actual causation (apart from its complete lack of
guidance on what constitutes a 'factor') is that the alleged cause must
be a substantial factor," demanding a quantitative measure without
providing any specific quantitative requirement.262  Thus, the
"substantial factor" test is an excellent judicial tool, except that courts
nationwide are at complete odds with each other as to the meaning of
"substantial," as well as to the meaning of "factor." '263
In Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,2" for example, the California
Supreme Court urged that the "substantial factor" doctrine was
"formulated to aid plaintiffs as a broader rule of causality than the
'but for' test. 265 Accordingly, the court held that "[u]ndue emphasis
should not be placed on the term 'substantial."'266  While the
Rutherford court admitted that the "substantial factor" test "has been
invoked by defendants whose conduct is clearly a 'but for' cause of
plaintiff's injury but is nevertheless urged as an insubstantial
contribution to the injury," it found this reasoning to be a "[m]isuse[]"
of the doctrine.267  Thus, Rutherford exemplifies one point on the
spectrum of opinion as to the meaning of "substantial" as used in the
"substantial factor" doctrine-a cause may not be the only cause of
the harm, and indeed may not even be a "but for" cause, and yet have
contributed sufficiently to have created liability for the tortfeasor.268
On the other hand, many courts have held that the "substantial
factor" standard is a heightened one compared to the "but for" test.
For example, in Zuchowicz v. United States, 29 Judge Guido Calabresi
outlined the "substantial factor" test for the Second Circuit as follows:
"(a) that the defendant's negligent act or omission was a but for cause
of the injury, (b) that the negligence was causally linked to the harm,
and (c) that the defendant's negligent act or omission was proximate
to the resulting injury. '"27" And in Herkert v. Secretary of the
Department of Health & Human Services,27" ' the U.S. Court of Claims
held that the "[p]etitioner must not only show that but for the vaccine
261. Id. at 102.
262. Wright, supra note 61, at 1782 (emphasis in original).
263. Id.




268. See id. at 1213-25.
269. 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.).
270. Id. at 388-89.
271. No. 97-518V, 2000 U.S. Claims LEXIS 12 (Ct. C1. Jan. 19, 2000).
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[the plaintiff] would not have had the injury, but also that the vaccine
was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury. '272 Clearly, in
these jurisdictions, the "substantial factor" test requires an additional
showing beyond "but for."
Furthermore, it is far from settled case law that the "substantial
factor" doctrine is applicable only to factual, and not proximate cause.
In Densberger v. United Technologies Corp.,273 the defendant asserted
that the district court's bald statement that "'[p]roximate cause'
simply means substantial factor" had been error.7 4 While the Second
Circuit noted that the instruction was "incomplete," it found the error
harmless as the charge had "sufficiently covered the essential issues"
of causation.275 Nonetheless, harmless or not, the district court clearly
did not fully examine the Zuchowicz factors.27' The fact that
Densberger can be nonetheless reasonably synthesized with
Zuchowicz does not adequately counter the charge by the ALI that
the standard is "confusing. 2 7
Another group of cases simply define "substantial factor" to mean
that the factfinder is convinced on causation. In DeBurkarte v.
Louvar,278 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld an instruction that
"[s]ubstantial means that a party's conduct has such an effect in
producing the harm as to lead a reasonable person to regard it as a
cause. '"279 The Missouri Supreme Court also used this circular
definition in Ray v. Upjohn Co. 2 11 opining opaquely that the word
"[s]ubstantial denotes that the defendant's conduct had such an effect
that reasonable people would regard it as the cause of the harm. 22 '
Indeed, there are even cases that call into question Dean Prosser's
assurances about the ability of the non-legal mind to comprehend the
phrase "substantial factor. ' 2 2  In Williams v. Department of
Revenue,"3 the Supreme Court of Alaska's primary task was to
untangle the meaning that had been attached to the phrase
"substantial factor" by a key expert witness in a workers'
compensation hearing." The doctor stated that "work-related stress
'was a major factor in the employee's having to quit her job in 1990,'
272. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
273. 297 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2002).
274. Id. at 72 n.8 (internal quotations omitted).
275. Id. at 73 (internal quotations omitted).
276. See id.; Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1998).
277. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 39.
278. 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986).
279. 1d. at 138 n.3 (internal quotations omitted).
280. 851 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1993) (internal quotations omitted).
281. Id. at 654.
282. See Prosser, supra note 4, § 41, at 248.
283. 938 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1997).
284. Id. at 1074.
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even though he also testified that 'a major factor is not a substantial
factor.'"
285
Scholarship has come to recognize the difficulty of pinning any
universal meaning on the phrase "substantial factor." Even Dean
Prosser was against the expansion of the use of the test, arguing that
its use "tends to leave to the jury matters which should be decided by
the court. '286  More recently, one scholar commented that "the
traditional specific causation instruction couched in terms of
'substantial factor' is unnecessarily vague, in that it provides too little
guidance to a serious factfinder.12 7  Another scholar has observed
that "the term 'substantial factor,' which has come to mean many
things to the courts, may prove confusing to a jury, and its application
has been inconsistent in case law. 2 s The test's vagueness also leaves
it open to charges that the "substantial factor" "is guided by policy
much more than by the 'but for' test," undercutting the argument that
application of the "substantial factor" standard is an efficacious
remedy for the shortcomings of the "but for" test.289
C. Proposed Revisions to the Restatement (Second)
If the drafters of the Draft Revisions are dissatisfied with the
"substantial factor" test as a means by which to address perceived
shortcomings in the "but for" test, its abandonment nonetheless
would leave a void where many hard causation cases have been
decided in the past. The Draft Revisions propose to fill that gap with
section 27's concept of "Multiple Sufficient Causal Sets, '29' with
section 28(b)'s enunciation of the traditional Summers v. Tice rule, 9
with the treatment of proximate cause under section 29 (which is still
under discussion within the Institute), 292 and by placing the ALI
condoned treatment of "loss of chance" doctrine out of causation
analysis altogether.293 Thus, the Draft Revisions suggest addressing
the "two fires" cases in section 27;294 "indeterminate defendant" cases,
such as many toxic torts, environmental torts, and future market share
liability applications in section 28(b); 295 "butterfly effect" cases in
285. Id.
286. Prosser, supra note 4, § 42.
287. Vern R. Walker, Direct Inference in the Lost Chance Cases: Factfinding
Constraints Under Minimal Fairness to Parties, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 247, 301 (1994).
288. Amy J. Vyhlidal, Note, Concurrent Omission: How Should Liability be
Allocated? Haag v. Bongers, 256 Neb. 170, 589 N.W.2d 318 (1999), 78 Neb. L. Rev.
925, 926 (1999).
289. Aaron Gershonowitz, What Must Cause Injury in Products Liability?, 62 Ind.
L.J. 701, 707 (1987).
290. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27, at 68.
291. Id. § 28(b); see Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1,4-5 (Cal. 1948).
292. Id. § 29.
293. Id. § 26 cmt. n, at 65.
294. Id. § 27 illus. 1, at 69.
295. Id. § 28(b).
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section 29;29 ( and removing "loss of chance" cases from causation
analysis altogether and move it into the analysis of injury. 297
1. Section 26: Factual Cause
The Draft Revisions recommend that the ALI squarely align itself
behind the "but for" test.298  While the previous Restatements
included the "but for" test as an element of "legal cause," it was de-
emphasized-appearing only as part of a limitation of the definition of
"substantial factor. '299 The Draft Revisions are as articulate in silence
as in enunciation-while they would allow the "but for" test to stand
on its own for the first time, they would simultaneously excise any
mention of the phrase "substantial factor" from the body of the text,
arguing in the commentary:
[Substantial factor's] primary function was to permit the factfinder
to decide that factual cause existed when there were overdetermined
causes-each of two separate causal chains sufficient to bring about
the plaintiff's harm, thereby rendering neither a but for cause. The
substantial factor test has not, however, withstood the test of time,
proving confusing and being misused.""
Remarkably, the ALI defines withstanding the "test of time" by
whether the rule creates "confus[ion]" and by the incidence of its use
for its intended (by the drafters of the Restatement, presumably)
purpose.3"" The ALI makes no reference here to the level of the rule's
judicial acceptance as a measure of its success.
No evaluation of the ALI's "misuse" standard as a litmus test for
the success of the "substantial factor" doctrine is possible without
looking to the original purpose of the rule as written by the ALI, as
contrasted to the purposes for which it is used by courts today. The
ALI's original purpose was to protect defendants from unlimited
liability for the effects of their tortious acts, with a minor exception for
overdetermination." 2  Alternatively, many courts today use the
doctrine as a "broader" standard, intended to aid plaintiffs who would
otherwise fail the "but for" test. 3
The Draft Revisions also suggest that the Restatement treat factual
causation by itself, in a separate chapter from the discussion of
proximate cause, thus eliminating the need for the bifurcated
discussion of "legal cause" contained in sections 430 through 33 of the
296. Id. § 29.
297. Id. § 26 cmt. j.
298. See Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. b, at 30, 46-48.
299. See Restatement (Second), supra note 21, at § 432.
300. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 39 (citation omitted).
301. Id.
302. See supra Part I.B.2.
303. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997).
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Restatement (Second).3"4  This rejection of the amalgamating
nomenclature "legal cause" employed by the first two
Restatements," 5 is intended to clarify the standards discussed.3" 6
Accordingly, the Draft entirely abandons the phrase "legal cause."3"7
2. Section 27: Multiple Sufficient Causal Sets
Another innovation proposed by the Draft Revisions is the
conception of all necessary causes combining to create a "causal
set."3"" The Draft first introduces "causal set" nomenclature in section
26, stating:
An actor's tortious conduct need only be a factual cause of the
other's harm. The existence of other causes of the harm does not
affect whether specified tortious conduct was a necessary condition
for the harm to occur .... Recognition of multiple causes does not
require modifying or abandoning the "but for" standard in this
section. Tortious conduct by an actor need be only one of the causes
of another's harm. When there are multiple sufficient causes, each
of which is sufficient to cause the plaintiff's harm, supplementation





304. Restatement (Second), supra note 21, §§ 430-33.
305. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. a, at 30 (admitting that "[d]espite the
venerability of the 'legal cause' term in Restatement history, it has not been widely
adopted in judicial and legal discourse nor is it helpful in explicating the ground that it
covers").
306. Id. The Reporter offers no explaination for the discrepancy between the
reference here to "judicial and legal discourse" as a standard for the success of the
"legal cause" nomenclature, and the apparent opinion of the ALl that the virtual
omnipressence of the "substantial factor" doctrine in causation jurisprudence is of
little significance. Compare id. § 26 cmt. a, with id. § 26 cmt. j; see also supra note 21
and accompanying text.
307. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. a, at 29-30.
308. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. c, at 30.
309. Draft Revisions, supra note 20. § 26, at 30-31 (parenthetical omitted). The
Draft Revisions' use of the language of "causal sets" seems on the surface to have
been influenced by Professor Richard Wright. See Wright, Pruning the Bramble Bush,
supra note 1, at 1018-42 (arguing for a replacement of counterfactual "but for"
analysis with a proactive inquiry into whether the tortious act was a "Necessary
Element of a Sufficient Set" (the "NESS" test), or whether the act was part of a
causal set which was in itself sufficient to bring about the injury). Professor Wright
was himself admittedly influenced by H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honor4's seminal work,
Causation in the Law. Id. at 1001-10. But Wright's influence on the ALI's Draft
Revisions seems to be in form rather than substance. The key aspect of the NESS
test-a shift from counterfactual analysis to a proactive inquiry into what actually
happened-is notably missing from the Draft Revisions' firm commitment to the
counterfactual nature of the "but for" analysis. See Draft Revisions, supra note 20, §
26 cmt. e, at 33 (asserting that a determination of factual cause "requires a
counterfactual inquiry" (emphasis added)).
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Section 27 comes into play in cases involving two or more extant
causal sets, each individually sufficient to bring about the harm.3" In
this case, and in this case only, a causal set that does not satisfy the
counterfactual analysis of the "but for" test may nonetheless serve as
the basis for liability."' Thus, where the Restatement (Second)
invoked the "substantial factor" test, the Draft Revisions propose to
strictly limit the use of this renamed analysis to these unusual
circumstances.
The comments to the Draft Revisions expressly bring circumstances
of "incremental" causation under the umbrella of section 27, including
cases where "tortious conduct by one actor is insufficient, even with
other background causes"3"2 to cause the harm, but "when combined
with conduct by other persons, the conduct overdetermines the
harm."3 '3  Under section 27, all contributing causes would be
considered to be factual causes.'
3. Section 28(b): Burden of Proof
Section 28(b) is not substantially different from the section it
replaces in the Restatement (Second)."' Where it differs, it merely
clarifies those elements of the Summers rule which have evolved in
the years since the adoption of the Restatement (Second).
Specifically, it limits the Summers rule by requiring the joinder of all
defendants, proof by the plaintiff that the actions of all defendants
were tortious, and proof by the plaintiff that the tortious act of at least
one of the defendants actually caused the plaintiff's injury." 6 In these
cases, as under the old rule, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the
defendant."7 But the Draft Revisions go further, expressly stating
that the burden of production shifts to the defendant as well."' In
short, the revisions contained in section 28(b) are little more than
310. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27, at 68-94.
311. Id.
312. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27 cmt. f., at 73.
313. Id; see, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that plaintiff need only prove that "the defendant's asbestos products was, in
reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in causing or contributing to his
risk of developing cancer," and that the plaintiff "need not prove ... that fibers from a
particular defendant's asbestos-containing products were those, or among those, that
actually began the cellular process of malignancy" (first two emphases added)).
314. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 27 cmt. f, at 73-75, 85-88.
315. Restatement (Second), supra note 21, § 433B.
316. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 28(b), at 95.
317. Id.; The Restatement (Second), supra note 21, § 433B(2), states:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his
liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among
them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
318. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 28(b), at 95.
2718 [Vol. 71
2003] THE "BUT FOR" TEST 2719
overdue housekeeping, updating the Restatement (Second) with more
recent jurisprudential analysis.
4. Reporters' Notes
While the ALI's Restatements are not primary authority, they reap
a great deal of their extraordinary persuasiveness from their perceived
reliability in presenting the current state of the law.319 Accordingly,
writing and rewriting the Restatements is one of the most significant
undertakings in which the ALI engages.3 211 Separately, the Institute
also engages in the creation of extensive recommendations for how
the law should evolve-most notably in the form of "model codes. 3 21
But the ALI has recently been subjected to extensive criticism, with
many scholars charging the Institute with blurring the line between a
"restatement" of the law and recommendation for the law's change.322
Therefore, in addition to a clear appraisal of the substance of the
proposed changes, a detached critical analysis also demands an
assessment of the legitimacy of the support in case law for the
revisions. For this purpose, an examination of the Reporters' Notes is
necessary.3 23
The Reporters offer a wide range of support for the "but for" rule,
asserting that courts and scholars alike "routinely acknowledge that
the but-for test is central to determining factual cause. 3 24 The Draft
Revisions invoke cases in support of this statement, interpreting law
from fifteen different jurisdictions, 3 25 as well as a wide range of
319. This is the goal of the Restatements, according to the ALI's website at
http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm (last visited on Apr. 3, 2003).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb.
2000) (stating that § 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) "has no basis in the case law,"
and declining to adopt it, in favor of § 402(a) of the Restatement (Second)); Frank J.
Vandall, The American Law Institute Is Dead in the Water, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 801
(1998) (arguing that the rejection of the consumer expectations rule in the ALI's
treatment of product liability in the Restatement (Third) is not a fair reflection of the
state of the law); Calabresi Interview, supra note 3 (questioning the utility of ALI
prescriptions for the law); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of
Interest of ALI Members in Drafting the Restatements, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 641, 660
(1998) (arguing that "[c]onflicts of interest on the part of members of the ALl have
called into question the integrity of ALI Restatements of the Law"). But see Victor E.
Schwartz, The Restatement, Third, Torts: Products Liability: A Model of Fairness and
Balance, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 41 (2000) (asserting that the Restatement (Third)
"favors [neither] plaintiffs nor defendants [and] is based on case law written by
America's judges").
323. See Draft Revisions, supra note 20, §§ 26-28, at 45-68, 80-94, 134-190. The
Reporters' Notes are written by Michael D. Green and William Charles Powers, Jr.,
and represent their views. See supra note 31.
324. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. b, at 46.
325. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. b, at 46-47. These jurisdictions
include New Jersey (Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 73-75 (3d
Cir. 1996)), Pennsylvania (Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 366-68 (3d
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scholarship1 2' The pedigree of the "but for" test may be so venerable
that it need not be proven yet again at this late date-but the
Reporters nonetheless thoroughly ground the Institute's reasoning in
caselaw and scholarship.3 2
7
In Comment j of the same section, the Reporters make the
Institute's case for the excision of "substantial factor" language from
the Restatement. 2 They begin with an admission that the "treatment
of 'substantial factor' in both [preceding] Torts Restatements is
confusing,""32 and argue that the test "has few supporters among
commentators."33  Comment j further declares that "[w]ith the sole
exception of multiple sufficient causes, 'substantial factor' provides
nothing of use in determining whether factual cause exists."33
Startlingly, given the near universal infiltration of the "substantial
factor" test into the judicial discourse,332 the Reporters cite a single
scholar and no courts for this remarkable proposition.33
The Reporters build a case against "substantial factor" based on
logical analysis. 34 The Reporters assert that as a test for factual
causation, the standard is "undesirably vague." '35 Extensively noting
examples in the case law, the Comment states that this vagueness
could "lure a factfinder into thinking that a substantial factor means
Cir. 1990)), Indiana (Collins v. Am. Optometric Ass'n, 693 F.2d 636, 640-41 (7th Cir.
1982)), the Federal Circuit (Bunting v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 867,
871-73 (Fed. Cir. 1991)), Alaska (Vincent v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847,
851-52 (Alaska 1993)), Connecticut (Stewart v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 662 A.2d
753, 757-59 (Conn. 1995), Delaware (Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1096-97 (Del.
1991)), Florida (Sardell v. Malanio, 202 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 1967)), Iowa (Gerst v.
Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 816-17 (Iowa 1996)), Missouri (Callahan v. Cardinal
Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993)), Montana (Young v. Flathead County,
757 P.2d 772, 777 (Mont. 1988)), Nebraska (Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Kaiser Agric.
Chem. Co., 425 N.W.2d 872, 881 (Neb. 1988)), New Hampshire (Bronson v.
Hitchcock Clinic, 677 A.2d 665, 668 (N.H. 1996)), South Carolina (Olson v. Faculty
House of Carolina, Inc., 544 S.E.2d 38 (S.C. 2001)), and Washington (Daugert v.
Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 605-06 (Wash. 1985)). Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt.
b, at 46-47.
326. These citations include such divergent authors as Wex S. Malone, Patrick
Atiyah, Arno C. Becht, Frank W. Miller, Guido Calabresi, David A. Fischer, Michael
S. Moore, David W. Robertson. Jane Stapleton, Glanville Williams, and Richard W.
Wright. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. b, at 47-48.
327. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. b, at 46-48.
328. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 56-63.
329. Id. at 56.
330. Id. at 61. In support of this assertion, the Reporters cite Arno C. Becht, Frank
W. Miller, Dan B. Dobbs, Bert Black, David H. Hollander, Jr., William V. Dorsaneo
Ill, Leon Green, Charles 0. Gregory, David W. Robertson, Jane Stapleton, Robert
Strassfeld, Richard Wright, and the seminal work of H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honor&
Id. at 61-62.
331. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 57.
332. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
333. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 57 (citing Robertson, supra note
43, at 1777-78).
334. Id. at 56-63.
335. Id. at 57.
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something less than a but-for cause or, conversely, may suggest that
the factfinder distinguish among factual causes, determining that some
are and some are not 'substantial factors.' ' 336 Thus, largely in the
interest of clarity, rather than on grounds of caselaw, the Draft
Revisions urge the superiority of the "but for" test.
III. THE DRAFF REVISIONS:
DOING THE RIGHT THING IN THE WRONG WAY
Finding inconsistencies in the law, however, is not tantamount to
resolving those differences. In purporting to clarify the law in this
area, the ALI may well be crossing the line from restating the law to
prescribing a solution.
The Draft notes that the "treatment of 'substantial factor' in both
Restatements is confusing." '337 Given its willingness to accept at least
partial blame for the current state of judicial uncertainty, the ALI
should attempt to clear up the problem in the Restatement (Third).
But if the new Restatement is to avoid exacerbating the problem, it is
vital for the Reporters to be exacting in their evaluation of the
authority upon which they rely. If the ALI is going to excise a concept
as central to contemporary jurisprudence as the "substantial factor"
test of causation, the Reporters' Notes must clearly indicate the extent
to which this change is a reflection of the evolution of legal thought as
manifested in case law, as opposed to a manifestation of the ALI's
mission to create a work product containing "extensive
recommendations or proposals for change in the law. 33 ' A critical
examination of those cases and articles on which the Reporters' Notes
rely is therefore indispensable to an evaluation of the revisions to the
body of the Restatement.
This part argues that a return to the "but for" test is warranted. 9
But the Reporters' Notes offered by the drafters are incomplete and
require additional work.4 °  There are a number of cases and
controlling precedents that the Reporters' Notes either ignore or give
336. Id. Jurisdictions cited as representing the notion that "substantial factor" is a
higher standard than "but for" standing alone include the Federal Circuit (Shyface v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 165 F.3d 1344, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), Idaho
(Challis Irrigation Co. v. State, 689 P.2d 230, 235 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)), Delaware
(Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094 (Del. 1991)), and Iowa (Ten Hagen v. DeNooy, 563
N.W.2d 4 (Iowa 1997)). Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 63. Jurisdictions
cited for a construction of the "substantial factor" doctrine as something less than
"but for" include Indiana (Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384 (Ind. 1995)),
Kansas (Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984)), and New Jersey (Hake
v. Manchester Township, 486 A.2d 836 (N.J. 1985)). Draft Revisions, supra note 20, §
26 cmt. j, at 63.
337. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 56.
338. Am. Law Inst., About the ALl, at http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2003).
339. See infra Part III.A.
340. See infra Part III.B.
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short shrift.34' This part concludes that, if the ALl is to avoid reliving
the embarrassments of the recent past, it must be more forthcoming
about precisely where it draws the line between restating the law and
articulating the direction in which the Institute believes the law should
develop.1 2
A. The Right Thing: Fulfilling the Promise of
The American Law Institute
In proposing these changes, which recognize the unhelpful
contribution of the Restatement (Second) to the development of the
common law in the area of factual causation, the ALI has shown an
admirable willingness to return to its roots by adopting a Restatement
that aspires to "restate" the law as it is, rather than articulating a
prescription for what it ought to become.
Nonetheless, to make manifest that aspiration to "restate" the law
with integrity, the Reporters should offer the legal community a closer
examination of the sources on which the Draft relies. Cases cited for
the proposition that "substantial factor" is either an easier or a more
difficult standard to meet than "but for" need to be on point. The
ALI should concede that many jurisdictions have adopted the
"substantial factor" test and show no evidence of dissatisfaction with
it. For purposes of intellectual honesty, it is vital for the Institute to
acknowledge that its proposal for a recommitment to "but for"
causation to the exclusion of the "substantial factor" test is a
prescriptive vision of the law. If only in the interest of clarifying
confusion caused by previous Restatements, the ALI should make this
clear.
1. Section 26: "But For" Prevails over "Substantial Factor"
The "but for" test is the worst mechanism to determine factual
cause imaginable, except for all the others that have been tried so
far.343 Problems with the test are numerous, but the advantages
outweigh them by far.344 The test's extensive pedigree has made it
well-respected by a judicial system that places great emphasis on
precedent, and great value on judicial certainty.3 45 The logic of "but
341. Id.
342. See infra Part iII.B.4.
343. Cf Winston Churchill, Remarks in the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947),
reprinted in The Political Resource Page, available at http://www.politicalresource.net/
winston churchill-quotations.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) ("Many forms of
Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one
pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time.").
344. Seesupra Part II.A.
345. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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for" is conceptually clear enough to be grasped by finders of fact of
any level of sophistication.346 In the vast majority of cases, it produces
results that are in alignment with the everyday person's intuitive sense
of justice. 347
That the ALI proposes to excise all use of the phrase of "substantial
factor" in the Draft Revisions is laudable. While there is clearly a
need for a "patch" to the "but for" test to address those circumstances
where "but for" simply fails to produce an intuitively just result, the
"substantial factor" doctrine has created much judicial mischief since
its inception.
There is nothing wrong with the "substantial factor" test, except for
the fact that there is neither scholarly nor judicial agreement on the
definition of "substantial," nor is there any consensus on the meaning
of "factor. '349 This linguistic ambiguity has created a "doctrine" which
is little more than a jurisprudential Rorschach blot-in one
circumstance justifying a relaxed standard of causation, in another
supporting a heightened standard, and in yet another providing
nothing more than a synonym for the "but for" test.35 This vagueness
has created substantial uncertainty, and threatens to undermine the
confidence of plaintiffs and defendants alike in the ability of the
courts to treat "like cases alike. 35'
Nonetheless, the AL has an obligation to the legal community to
clearly acknowledge the prevalence of this standard. There are, after
all, many jurisdictions which have used the "substantial factor" test for
much of the twentieth century, even if in tandem with or as part of the
"but for" standard. Courts in those jurisdictions are unlikely to be
persuaded by a Restatement that fails to take notice of this stark legal
reality. For example, thorough discussion in the Reporters' Notes of
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,352 Keir v. United States,3 53 or
Reynolds v. Gonzalez,354 and the Pattern Jury Instructions from
346. See supra text accompanying note 53-54.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
348. See supra Part II.B.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (noting that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "embodies a general rule that States must treat
like cases alike").
352. 941 P.2d 1203, 1206-07 (Cal. 1997) (holding that "the plaintiff must, in
accordance with traditional tort principles, demonstrate to a reasonable...
probability that a product or products supplied by the defendant, to which he became
exposed, were a substantial factor in causing his disease or risk of injuries" (emphasis
added)). Interestingly, the Draft Revisions cite this case as support for § 27. Draft
Revisions, § 27 cmt. g, at 85.
353. 853 F.2d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that "[o]nce a prima facie case has
been established, the trier of fact must determine whether the defendant's conduct
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury of which plaintiff complains"
(emphasis added)).
354. 798 A.2d 67, 75 (N.J. 2002) (expressly declining to abolish the "substantial
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California, '351 New Jersey,35 and New York35 7 would go a long way
toward clarifying the confusion.
The commentary in section 26 directly addresses the evolution of
the "loss of chance" doctrine for the first time in an ALI
Restatement. 5 To some extent, this commentary clears the muddy
waters created by the vigorous churn of change in this volatile area of
the law. By urging courts to refrain from misusing the language of
section 323 of the Restatement (Second) as justification for a relaxed
standard of causation, the Draft Revisions restore some consistency
and coherence to the doctrine-perhaps saving the "loss of chance"
doctrine from its own most ardent supporters. By recommending the
use of the proportional approach to "loss of chance" analysis, and the
rejection of the reduced standard of causation approach, the ALI
lends credibility to the new doctrine."'
At least one scholar and jurist evaluates this approach as "probably
fair."3"' The Draft Revisions suggest a doctrinal placement for loss of
chance doctrine (in the analysis of injury, rather than as part of the
causation inquiry) where it may do the most good for plaintiffs who
need it, but at the least risk to the certainty of tort law in general.3 '
2. Section 27-Two Fires, et al., Under the Draft Revisions
In practice, the substance of the "new" test articulated in section 27
would be little more than the "substantial factor" test without the
phrase "substantial factor." But in addition, the ALI recommends
that courts strictly circumscribe its use to cases involving multiple
sufficient causation. 2 In this manner, the ALI's proposal retains the
strength of the "substantial factor" test (its ability to pinch hit for "but
for" in the rare instances of multiple sufficient causation, where "but
factor" test on the grounds of its vagueness and confusion, and stating that when there
are two or more causes to an injury, each individual cause "need not... be capable of
producing the injury; it is enough if [the cause in question is] a substantial factor in
bringing [the injury] about" (emphasis added)).
355. Cal. Jury Inst. (Civil), BAJI 3.76 (2002) [hereinafter California Jury
Instructions] (stating that a cause of an injury, damage, loss or harm is "something
that is a substantial factor in bringing [it] about" (emphasis added)).
356. N.J. Model Jury Charges (Civil), Ch. 7.10 (1998/1999) (requiring for a showing
of causation that the defendant's act was "a cause which necessarily set the other
causes in motion and was a substantial factor in bringing the accident about"
(emphasis added)). It is perhaps significant to note that while this language may
suggest a "but for"-plus test in theory, Reynolds suggests precisely the opposite in
practice. 798 A.2d at 75 (stating that application of the "substantial factor" test is a
"reduced burden of proof of causation").
357. N.Y. Pattern Jury Inst., PJI 2:70 ("An act or omission is regarded as a cause of
an injury if it was a substantialflictor in bringing about the injury." (emphasis added)).
358. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. n, at 42-44.
359. See supra Part I.B.3.d.
360. Calabresi Interview, supra note 3.
361. See supra Part 1.B.3.d.
362. See supra Part II.C.2.
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for" fails), without the risk of judicial misunderstanding or deliberate
stretching created by the use of the tremendously vague "substantial
factor" language. M The new articulation retains the inclusiveness of
"substantial factor," while happily scrapping its scattershot approach.
B. The Wrong Way: The Reporters' Notes
Build a Case for "But For" on a Foundation of Sand
1. "Substantial Factor" is a More Stringent Standard than "But For"
to Establish Factual Cause
The Draft Revisions cite only four cases in support of the
proposition that some jurisdictions "use[] the 'substantial factor'
requirement to impose a more onerous burden on the plaintiff with
regard to factual cause than merely establishing but for causation":
two directly and two as indirect support (using a "see also" signal).364
First, the Reporters cite Shyface v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services365 as an example of this view. The Shyface opinion does
indeed state that "the standard of 'actual causation' is more stringent
than the 'but for' standard." '366 Elsewhere, though, the court seems to
be using "but for" as a synonym for factual cause, and "substantial
factor" for proximate cause, stating that "an action is the 'legal cause'
of harm if that action is a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the
harm, and ... the harm would not have occurred but for the action."367
In its discussion of the definition of "legal cause," the court cited
sections 431 of the Restatement (Second) in its entirety, which asserts
that: "legal cause [exists] if (a) [the defendant's] conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule
of law relieving the [defendant] from liability because of the manner
in which his negligence has resulted in the harm." The commentary to
the Restatement (Second) clarifies the meaning of subpart (b) with a
cross reference to sections 435 through 61.368 It is significant to note,
however, that these sections fall under the category headings "Rules
Which Determine the Responsibility of a Negligent Actor for Harm
Which His Conduct is a Substantial Factor in Producing," '36 9
"Superseding Cause,""37 and "Causal Relation Affecting the Extent of
363. See id.
364. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 63.
365. 165 F.3d 1344, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
366. Id. at 1348 (citations omitted in original).
367. Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
368. Restatement (Second), supra note 21, § 431 cmt. d.
369. Id. §§ 435-39. This category includes sections on foreseeability, intended
consequences, unintended consequences of intended invasions, and so on.
370. Id. Superceding Cause includes sections on superceding cause, intervening
cause, acts done under impulsion of emotional disturbance, and harm increased or
accelerated by extraordinary forces of nature. Restatement (Second), supra note 21,
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Liability But Not Its Existence. 3 7' In short, section 431(b)
contemplates not what the Draft Revisions are partitioning into
factual cause, but what is currently referred to as proximate cause in
common judicial parlance.
Thus, the Shyface court relies heavily on the Restatement (Second)
to support its assumption that "legal cause" is the sum of factual cause
and proximate cause, and for the conclusion that the "substantial
factor" test may be used to invoke a higher standard for imposing
liability. While an inquiry into whether causation is sufficient to
justify the imposition of liability would certainly compel a higher
standard than one merely regarding factual cause, this inquiry
addresses the court's (and the Restatement's) complex definition of
"legal cause" far more than it does than the simpler formulation of
factual cause posited by the Draft Revisions.372 Thus, the Shyface
court seems to be addressing a question quite different from the one
for which the Reporters cite it.
Next, the Draft Revisions cite Challis Irrigation Co. v. Idaho,"'
where the plaintiff sought to recover for damages related to a break in
its canal subsequent to a flood (which raised the level of the river),
and which may have been exacerbated by an excess of debris which
had gathered in the defendant's "trash rack," located above a flood-
activated bypass.374 In its discussion of causation, the court stated:
[Factual cause] embraces two closely related elements. First, an
event is the cause in fact of a succeeding event only if the succeeding
event would not have occurred "but for" the prior event.... The
second element is a requirement that the first event be a "substantial
factor" in producing the succeeding event.37 5
Disturbingly, the Reporters fail to identify that these statements are
dicta, and that they are actually diametrically opposed to the
substance of the holding.376 The jury instruction in question used
neither the "but for" nor the "substantial factor" standard for
causation; instead it defined proximate cause as "a cause which, in
natural or probable sequence, produced the damage complained
of. ' 3 77 The opinion notes that this "instruction [did] not completely
explain the elements of cause in fact.... [Nor did the instruction]
§§ 440-53.
371. 165 F.3d at 1352. This category includes sections on insanity, mitigation, and
exacerbation of harm by unforeseeable circumstances. Restatement (Second), supra
note 21, §§ 454-61.
372. See Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26, at 29.
373. 689 P.2d 230 (Idaho 1984); Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26, at 63.
374. Challis, 689 P.2d at 233-34.
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make [the standard of causation] entirely clear. '37' The court
nonetheless accepted this definition for the purpose of review.379
Thus, despite holding that a reasonable jury could have found that
the defendant's negligence had resulted only in approximately twenty
percent of the increased volume of the canal, the court did not make a
quantitative inquiry into whether this twenty percent satisfied the
"substantial factor" test.31 1 Instead, the court merely inquired
"whether the jury, following the instructions given in this case,
reasonably could have inferred that the canal failure more probably
resulted from clogging at the trash rack, in combination with the
increased flow from the river, than from such increased flow alone.
3 81
Therefore, while the court invoked language that suggests its
philosophical sympathy with the idea for which the Draft cites Challis,
it nonetheless seems a strange citation for the proposition that
"substantial factor" is a standard which "impose[s] a more onerous
burden on the plaintiff" given that the court imposed no such burden
in this case.382
The first case the Draft Revisions cite as indirect support for this
proposition is Culver v. Bennett.8 3 The Culver court suggests that the
"substantial factor" rule is harder on plaintiffs, and that it is therefore
most commonly "invoked in cases in which a defendant's conduct is
clearly a 'but for' cause of plaintiff's harm, and defense counsel
contends that defendant's conduct made such an insubstantial
contribution to the outcome that liability should not be imposed."3"4
Nonetheless, readers of the Draft Revisions might be forgiven for
concluding that this analysis holds little weight in an opinion which
clearly rejects any such application of the rule . 8  The court utterly
disavows the "substantial factor" rule, stating that "our time-honored
definition of proximate cause has been the but for rule.... Most
simply stated, proximate cause is [defined in Delaware as] that direct
cause without which the accident would not have occurred."3"' Thus
the court ordered a new trial, despite the fact that the plaintiff had not
raised the issue below, holding that the use of "substantial factor"
language in the jury instructions was "plain error"38 7 which "resulted
378. Id.
379. Id.380. Id. at 236.
381. Id. (emphasis added).
382. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 63.
383. 588 A.2d 1094 (Del. 1991).
384. Id. at 1099.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1097 (internal quotations omitted, alterations in original).
387. Id. at 1096 (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986), as
stating that "[ulnder the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must
be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity
of the trial process." (citation omitted)).
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in a defense verdict." '  Accordingly, this case also seems to be
inapposite.
Finally, the Draft Revisions cite Ten Hagen v. DeNooy."
However, this opinion repeatedly anchors its analysis of the use of the
"substantial factor" test as a tool to be utilized in the proximate cause
inquiry.39  In fact, the opinion is entirely devoid of both the word
"factual" and the word "actual. '39' Considering this, it may be that
Ten Hagen is perhaps even more indirectly related to the Draft
Revisions' proposition than suggested by the "see also" signal used by
the Reporters.392
2. "Substantial Factor" is a Lower Standard than "But For"
Alternatively, the Draft cites a number of cases for the proposition
that "substantial factor" is actually a lower standard than "but for,- 393
suggesting that it is permissible to invoke "substantial factor" rhetoric
in order to find liability where the case for "but for" causation is
defective. These cases fall easily into two categories-those that the
ALI puts forth as generally supporting the proposition, and those
which impose liability for the "loss of a chance" of survival in medical
malpractice.394
The Draft Revisions cite only three cases as support for the
proposition that some jurisdictions construe "substantial factor" to be
a lower standard than "but for" causation.395 Interestingly, given the
extensive treatment given by the Draft to "loss of chance" cases in
Comment n, two of these cases in the general discussion of
"substantial factor" are medical malpractice "loss of chance" cases as
well, leaving only a single case citation to support the general
principle as applied outside of the area of medical malpractice.3 ('
Interestingly, that lone non-medical case, Hake v. Manchester
Township,397 also addressed circumstances involving a lost chance of
survival.395 In this case, the plaintiff's son had been arrested by a local
388. Culver, 588 A.2d at 1099.
389. 563 N.W.2d 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
390. Id. at 8. The court held that:
[l]n order to be a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, it is not enough to
assert that the harm to plaintiff would not have occurred had defendants not
been negligent. Although a finding of negligence is necessary. it is not,
standing alone, sufficient. The fault or negligence of a defendant must also
be a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff's harm.
I(. (emphasis added).
391. Id.
392. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, §26 cmt. j, at 63.
393. Id.
394. Id. § 26 cmt. n., at 65-68.
395. Id. at 63.
396. Id.
397. 486 A.2d 836 (N.J. 1985).
398. Id. at 838.
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police department for stealing his father's car.399 While isolated in a
room at the police station,4"" the decedent hanged himself with his
belt. 1 When he was found, an officer trained in first aid requested
permission from the Chief of Police to cut him down and try to
resuscitate him.4 2 The Chief denied permission, saying that he
"wanted him left where he was. ,41"3
While the case does not address a medical question, the opinion is
laden with references to the use of "loss of chance" doctrine in
medical malpractice.4"4 By analogy to "loss of chance," the court held
that the plaintiff need only prove a "substantial possibility" of rescue,
had the defendant not failed in his duty.4"5 The court declared:
[C]ausation for failure to act [is] generally expressed in terms of
whether the conduct may be viewed as a substantial factor
contributing to the loss .... [P]laintiffs here need establish only that
defendants had a duty to try to save Robert's life and that there was
a substantial possibility of the rescue of their son from death.4" 6
Thus, the Hake court utilized the "loss of chance" doctrine in
combination with a modified "substantial factor" test (inquiring into
the existence of a "substantial possibility" of rescue) in an
unconventional (non-medical) circumstance.41" Furthermore, it did so
in a case involving an alleged breach of duty by omission, rather than
by commission.48 Given (a) these unusual facts, (b) the unusual cross-
pollination of "substantial factor" with "loss of chance" outside of the
realm of medical malpractice, and (c) the unusual use of a modified
"substantial factor" test seeking a "substantial possibility" of
successful rescue, it is unfortunate that this is the only non-"loss of
chance" case offered by the Draft to support this proposition.' 9
As discussed above, there are essentially two approaches to "loss of
chance" recovery. 4 "  The first, which remains truest to Professor
King's original proposal, is the reconceptualization of the injury in
these cases. 41 1  The second approach combines "loss of chance,"
399. Id. at 839.
400. Id. Whether he had been taken into custody was disputed at trial. Id.




405. Id. at 841.
406. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
407. Id.
408. See id. at 839-41. For a discussion of the problems created by this fusion of the
duty inquiry and the investigation into factual cause, see supra notes 243-49 and
accompanying text.
409. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 63.
410. See infra Part I.B.3.d.
411. See generally King, supra note 165. Thus, in a "loss of chance" case, there is a
recognition of the chance of survival as a thing of value in itself, and the injury for
which the plaintiff seeks recovery is understood to encompass the loss of some
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"substantial factor," and perhaps section 323 of the Restatement
(Second) in order to allow full recovery on a reduced standard of
causation.412
Comparing these two approaches, the Draft expressly urges the
reconceptualized injury approach over the relaxed causation standard.
The Reporters' Notes assert that "recognizing lost opportunity as
harm is preferable to employing a diluted 'substantial factor' or other
factual causation test, thereby leaving recovery to the unconstrained
inclination of any given jury and providing those fortunate plaintiffs
with a windfall in the form of full recovery for their physical harm. 4 13
Nonetheless, the Draft stops short of endorsing any "loss of chance"
approach at all, cautioning that because the doctrine addresses a
matter, the definition of injury within the framework of medical
malpractice specifically, which is outside the scope of the current
revisions to the Restatement (Second), the ALI "takes no position"
on it, leaving "loss of chance" to future Restatements to discuss more
thoroughly. 414
3. Jury Instructions
Although the Reporters' Notes to the Draft Revisions make more
than a cursory examination of the relevant case law, there are a
number of important issues left unanswered by the disparities
between the Reporters' analysis and the text of the cases and their
supporting jury instructions. If judges and scholars are to evaluate the
legitimacy of the proposed revisions to the Restatement, they will
need to be able to rely on the integrity of the Reporters' Notes.
Unfortunately, some of these disparities may call into question the
reliability of the Reporters' Notes as a whole.
For example, the Draft acknowledges that Mitchell v. Gonzales415 is
the leading case on the question of causation in tort under California
law. 41" The Reporters minimize Mitchell's significance with the
assertion that "the court objected not to the but-for component of the
instruction, but to the use of 'proximate cause' to describe factual
causation. 14 7 However, the court was unequivocal in a later case,
stating that "California has definitively adopted the substantial factor
test of the Restatement Second of Torts for cause-in-fact
portion of that chance. Id. at 1396-97.
412. See infra Part I.B.3.d. Jurisdictions cited by the Reporters as adhering to this
approach include Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and West Virginia. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. n, at 67.
413. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. n, at 43.
414. Id. § 26 cmt. n, at 44.
415. 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
416. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j at 63; Id. § 26 cmt. n., 65-68.
417. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 62.
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determinations. ''41 9 Moreover, one look at California's pattern jury
instructions shows that jurisdiction to be firmly committed to the
"substantial factor" doctrine, to the exclusion of the stricter (under
California law) "but for" test.419 Those instructions state, in full that
"[t]he law defines cause in its own particular way. A cause of injury,
damage, loss, or harm is something that is a substantial factor in
bringing about an injury, damage, loss, or harm. '421  The discrepancy
between these instructions and what is admitted by the Reporters'
Notes is unsettling.
The Draft also cites Vincent v. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital2' for
the proposition that Alaska uses "the but-for test routinely for factual
causation." '422 Vincent was a split decision, which held that the use of a
"but for" instruction was error, even if harmless. 423 The Reporters'
reliance on this case as proof of Alaska's commitment to the "but for"
rule is both misplaced and disturbing. Indeed, the issue on which the
court was split did not have to do with whether the "but for"
instruction was error (on that point, the judges were unanimous), but
on whether that error was harmless.42 4 In fact, the Alaska pattern jury
instruction uses an opaque combination of "substantial factor" and
"but for" which seems to be taken largely from the Restatement
(Second), which the Draft proposes to replace.425
Similarly, the Draft relies on Daugert v. Pappas426  for the
proposition that Washington "routinely" uses the "but for" test for
418. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997).
Interestingly, the Rutherford court cited Mitchell for that very proposition. Id.
419. California Jury Instructions, supra note 355.
420. Id.
421. 862 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1993).
422. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. j, at 63.
423. Vincent, 862 P.2d at 854.
424. Id. (Burke, J., dissenting) (stating that Justice Burke was "unable to agree that
the error in the trial court's instructions to the jury was harmless").
425. Compare Alaska's Pattern Jury Instruction on the Subject of Legal Cause,
Alaska Pat. Jur. Inst., Art. 3.06, available at http://www.state.ak.us/courts/juryins.htm,
with Restatement (Second), supra note 21, §§ 430-33.
A legal cause of harm is an act or failure to act which is a substantial factor
in bring[ing] about the harm. An act or failure to act is a substantial factor
in bringing about harm if it is more likely true than not true that:
1. the act or failure to act was so important in bringing about the harm that
a reasonable person would regard it as a cause and attach responsibility to it;
and
2. the harm would not have occurred but for the act or failure to act.
[There is, however, one exception to the requirement that the harm would
not have occurred but for the act, or failure to act, of the defendant. If two
forces operated to cause the harm, one because of the defendant and the
other not, and each force by itself was sufficient to cause the harm, then the
defendant's act or failure to act is a cause of the harm if it was so important
in bringing about the harm that a reasonable person would regard it as a
cause and attach responsibility to it.1
Alaska Pat. Jur. Inst., Art. 3.06, supra (bracketed text in original).
426. 704 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1985).
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factual causation.427 While this is a fair approximation of the rule used
in that case, it is a glaring omission that the Reporter fails to note the
extensive discussion in Daugert of a sizable exception to the "but for"
rule -Washington's commitment to "substantial factor" analysis in
"loss of chance" cases,42  as embodied in Herskovits.4 29  As noted
elsewhere in the Draft, Herskovits is a leading example of the reliance
on section 323 of the Restatement (Second) for the invocation of the
"substantial factor" doctrine in "loss of chance" cases. 3" Clearly, if
the proposed revisions were adopted by both the ALI and the
Washington courts, Herskovits would have to be reevaluated. 3'
Given the Draft's assertion that reliance on section 323 in
combination with the "substantial factor" doctrine is "misplaced," one
might be forgiven for the conclusion that the Reporters' failure to
synthesize Daugert with Herskovits is perhaps less than fully
forthcoming. 43
2
4. Prescription Versus Description
Judge Calabresi, for one, points out that "while [the Restatement's]
point of view about 'substantial factor' might be a perfectly good
one," he considers the notion that "a Restatement [should offer] a
prescriptive vision [to be] very much in doubt. ' 433  He argues that
although the Restatements have always attempted to identify trends
in the law, it is quite a different thing to attempt to set a trend.4 4 In
retrofitting its articulation of factual causation, the ALI is "being
descriptive in terms of results, but prescriptive in terms of theory.
435
Judge Calabresi points out a troubling point about the ALI's quest
for certainty-that it is possible to be too certain."' The "substantial
factor" doctrine has proven to be an "open ended" judicial tool which
has assisted courts in resolving thorny problems which have had
nothing to do with its original purpose.437 For example, he asks, would
the market share liability exception have evolved under the strict "but
for" test now advocated by the ALl?43
Some degree of certainty is necessary for the stability of tort law in
general, and so the revisions to the Restatement may be necessary.
427. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmit. j, at 63.
428. Dougert, 704 P.2d at 604-06.
429. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
430. Draft Revisions, supra note 20, § 26 cmt. n, at 67.
431. See id. (arguing that reliance on § 323 for -loss of chance" cases is
"misplaced," and urging the use of the formula allowing only proportional recovery).
432. Id.
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The Draft goes to great lengths to address most if not all of the
exceptions to the "but for" test which have evolved over the past
century.4 39 But the Draft can only incorporate "the exceptions that
have already been thought of."44
Therefore, depending on how the new Restatement would be used
by courts, adoption of the revisions runs the risk of
counterproductively freezing the law.44' As the ALI moves forward in
the approval process, an important question is raised: Do these
revisions attempt to lock out the possibility of new innovations?44 2 To
the extent that they do, their adoption by the ALl (and more
significantly, by the courts) presents a delicate balancing of the




Notwithstanding that the Restatements do not have the force of
law, they are tremendously persuasive. Since the adoption of the First
Restatement, courts have looked to the ALl for an independent
analysis of the state of the law. In their current form, sections 26 and
27 of the Draft Revisions are a significant and positive step forward in
the articulation of common law tort principles which are true to the
actual cases, while retaining credibility as internally coherent logical
doctrine. The AL should enthusiastically adopt these provisions.
And the courts would do well to implement them as written.
Nonetheless, the ALl has a responsibility to its constituency-judges,
scholars, and attorneys-to clarify where it is "restating" the law, and
where it is offering a prescriptive vision. The Reporters' Notes, as
they stand, are a good start in this direction. But additional work is
still required:
Arguably, the Institute stands in the position of the man in the
rhyme,444 at the crucial moment between bramble bushes. Having
once jumped into the bush by declaring "substantial factor" to be the
law when the doctrine was still in its infancy, the ALI has since (in its
own estimation) seen the "substantial factor" doctrine spin out of
control. It is now for the membership to consider a second jump into
the same type of bush, articulating as a "restatement" of the law the
ALI's prescriptive vision for the law's evolution (a full commitment to
"but for" at the expense of "substantial factor"). It is up to the ALl to
decide how confident it is, having scratched its eyes out once, that
439. See supra Part III.A.




444. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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taking this proposed step will succeed in "scratch[ing] 'em back in
again. 445
445. Id.
